COUNCIL ON HIGHER EDUCATION

HIGHER EDUCATION AND SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION
South Africa Case Study

Report produced by
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PART 1
THE PRE-APARTHEID PERIOD

1. Introduction

This paper advances and draws on the following four propositions. First, in analysing the role of universities in social transformation there is a need to draw a distinction between the pre- and post-Apartheid periods; the former focuses on practices of resistance to the Apartheid regime and the latter on constituting a democratic polity in part by addressing Apartheid legacies. The second draws attention to the unintended consequences of National Party policy. It established black universities to produce passive elites to administer ethnic political institutions but created instead terrains that established a vibrant oppositional student movement and other forms of resistance within and related to the higher education sector. Third, in the post 1994 period the position of the state towards the role of universities and social transformation is derived from a policy inevitably open to reading in two opposing ways. The state demands that universities contribute towards economic and socio-political transformation, yet the nature of the transition from Apartheid to a democratic regime, its macro-economic state policies, and the constraints of globalisation have led to two opposing tendencies. In the first, universities are expected to perform as viable “corporate enterprises” producing graduates to help steer South Africa into a competitive global economy. In the second, universities are expected to serve the public good and produce critical citizens for a vibrant democratic society. To be sure these two tendencies need not be inherently contradictory, yet they do contain in a country with deep class, race and gender divisions the possibility of pulling in opposite directions. Last, when we consider universities as intrinsic sites of civil society, then the focus on the relationship between the state and civil society can be used to better illuminate some of the problems associated with the role of universities in the post-Apartheid system. While the ANC controlled state actively pursues a transformative agenda, institutions of civil society continue to be sites of ongoing contestation and remain more reticent to change. Universities, like other civil society institutions, if they are not simplistically conceived as monolithic coherent blocs, but as constituted by different constituencies (faculty, departments, students, administrators, workers, etc.) allows us to see how various sectors could function in contradictory ways - reproducing, eroding, transforming or remaining consciously oblivious to inherited and prevailing social relations.

The report in summary is organised into three broad sections: The first part includes a descriptive analysis of the main features of higher education under white domination, particularly those features of the historically black universities (HBUs) that created the material conditions for the heightened role of student resistance. Particular focus is on student mobilised protest campaigns that helped produce the crisis of Apartheid rule after the mid 1970's. The second part locates post-Apartheid developments in higher education in relation to the nature of the transition and the macro-economic context adopted post-1994. The third section analyses the relations between State policies, university responses to higher education reform, and their empirical impact on the economic, political, social, and cultural spheres of post-Apartheid society.
1.1. Higher Education and Social Transformation

The role of higher education institutions in social change during Apartheid is more obvious and clearly visible than its role in the ongoing transformation of contemporary South African society. However, the intensely differentiated nature of higher education both in the past and present makes it difficult to speak about it as a “system” having coherence and an undifferentiated identity; hence it is problematic to conceive of a positive empirical relationship between higher education and social transformation in South Africa. The role of higher education institutions in contributing to the collapse of the Apartheid social order cannot be answered in an abstract, generalizable or purely causal manner. For example, while many black students, a few progressive academics in some departments, and unionised workers actively participated in the internal resistance movement to bring about the collapse of Apartheid, universities as institutions did not themselves serve as major levers of power against the old order. Instead, these institutions provided the institutional terrain, displaying repressive as well as conducive conditions (“protective spaces”) that facilitated student protest behaviour. Only when higher education institutions are disaggregated into their various constituents does the role of each sector with respect to social transformation become more apparent.

During the Apartheid period, black students at historically black institutions created by the regime to produce and domesticate emerging black elites made higher education an important terrain of student mobilisation, ideological debate, and resistance. At the same time, we should not ignore other elements of protest within higher education: the resistance, less profound, but nevertheless present of black students at historically white universities, the activism of progressive white students and academics, the odd registering of protest of government policy by managerial elites at the English liberal campuses, and anti-government petitions presented by the leadership of the black universities themselves. All of this resistance, while not being decisive on their own, played an important role in eroding the legitimacy of the Apartheid social formation.

The running battles between students and police, mass meetings, demonstrations, boycotts, passionate debates between students of different ideological camps, teargas infested lecture rooms—all expressive manifestations of student political struggle on the black and some white campuses—transgressed the confines of the universities and impacted upon other areas of civil society marking those spaces as terrains of social conflict and protest. The resistance of black students from the 1970’s, together with the strikes, boycotts and stayaways of workers, youth and working class communities involved in pitched battles with the police constituted the social forces that created the crisis of Apartheid rule in the 1980’s. This broad spectrum of internal civil resistance, together with global, regional, and national factors, ushered the collapse of the Apartheid regime (Price, 1990). Indeed, it is arguable whether South Africa’s democratic regime change, following the crisis of Apartheid rule in the 1980’s, would have occurred at all without the contribution of black students from the 1970’s onwards.

These practices of resistance are faint images to the present generation of students, a situation suggestive of the degree to which student life over the past ten years has become relatively “normal.” The democratic state intends higher education institutions to play a significant role in social transformation. Similar to post-authoritarian societies in the 1990’s and post-independence African states in the 1950’s (Coleman, 1994), the democratic South African state holds high developmentalist expectations for higher education institutions. In the main the state hopes that higher education institutions will contribute towards overcoming the legacies of the country’s racialised development, transform the society.
along democratic and more equitable lines, and make the country more competitive in the global economic system. It is not self-evident that these goals complement one another and whether higher education institutions can or will rise to the challenges that have been posed for them by the new democratic government.

As to be expected, the role universities can and ought to play in social transformation and the empirical role they do play is the focus of ongoing debate. Indeed, conflict over the core values concerning the direction, content, and quality of democratic social transformation – the subject of a broader societal discussion in political society, civil society and the state in the post-Apartheid period – has left the conversation of the role of universities and social transformation ongoing, passionate and the source of great complexity. The transforming impact of higher education institutions in the economic, political, social, and cultural spheres of society is open to debate. Crucial questions relate to how best to utilise the existing resources and capacities of universities? How can higher education institutions be transformed to make them more responsive to social and political goals? What are likely sources driving such changes? To the extent that there maybe pockets of resistance to democratic change in the society and universities how do we deal with this? What should be the nature of limits to university autonomy in the context of state subsidisation and pressing socio-economic pressures on the democratic society?

To begin with a heuristic generalisation we can identify two discourses of social transformation. The contours of the first emphasises quantitative, procedural changes to the “HE system”, the need for the “system” to be efficiently regulated and co-ordinated by the state, be more responsive to the real challenges posed by globalisation by creating a skilled workforce for the so-called “knowledge society.” The language of the present, the hard-nosed realities facing a small, middle-range power with historical backlogs like South Africa, a country located in an under-developed conflict prone region, but having to respond to the freight-train of globalisation, animates this standpoint. To respond to the new realities, a new education lexicon, part state-speak, part populist and part specialist, is associated with this approach. In this framework the choices open to the state elite are limited by factors out of its immediate control. This framework can be called the realist-instrumentalist paradigm.

The second nostalgically draws on the anti-Apartheid struggle for its bearings. It draws sustenance from the radical values popularised in the educational terrain of that struggle (the radical version of “peoples’ education”) as a template against which to evaluate post-Apartheid developments. The priority of the democratic state should be to substantively redistribute resources, to assign a critical role to universities in producing educated, well-rounded, Dewey-type citizens, and constantly reiterate the empowering quality of democratic society for those historically marginalized. The social conditions of those worst-off under Apartheid, the conditions and the struggles of the past are fore-grounded. Education, according to this standpoint, must contribute to the radical, not reformist, transformation of society. Obviously, it is difficult to easily place interventions in the discussion about higher education and social transformation neatly into one of these camps; elements comfortably located in each of these frames of reference, points of departure really, to various degrees present themselves in the higher education language used since 1994 within and outside the state.

The state and civil society in South Africa since 1994 have undergone remarkable changes, yet the resilience of old practices and ideas remains the cause of immense frustration and at times, anger. The capacity of the state to steer change in the higher education sector is complicated by the nature of the transition, macro-economic policies associated with
dominant conceptions of globalisation, and significant cultures that want to resist deracializing changes within higher education in the terms posed under transformation discourses. Nevertheless, while the state may not be able to in the short-term change society entirely on the basis of its own vision using higher education institutions as instruments, longer-term changes in social relations are taking place through the “normal” functioning of these institutions.

A marked development following the collapse of Apartheid is that rigid racially exclusive universities no longer exist. The resource-rich, formerly white universities have ceased to be the preserve of white students. The historically black universities are not repressive, dominating places where democratic, critical discussion is vigilantly policed. Most importantly, increasing numbers of first generation black students, mostly middle class but also from poor, rural, and urban working class backgrounds are entering higher education institutions. Initially, they went to the historically black universities, then increasingly, in fairly large numbers to some formerly white universities (Cooper, 2001). The 1980’s resistance generation may be inclined to view contemporary South African higher education institutions as becoming “normal universities”, where political activism has no intrinsic calling, competing with other pursuits attracting the interests of students. Yet, many of the struggles that motivated the 1980’s generation remain: the access of black women, working class, rural students in significant enough numbers to higher education institutions and to the leading universities in particular, the embarrassingly skewed racial composition of staff, where white academics dominate the key areas of university and academic life in all universities but especially at the historically white universities and technikons, and the need to restructure the curriculum to reflect the experiences, histories, cultures and politics of marginalized, subaltern discourses as these relate to the majority of continent-wide residents. The dominant institutional “ideologies”, everyday practices at universities, still have to undergo the social changes experienced by state institutions. In South Africa the state has changed, at least in the composition of its personnel, yet civil society, the sphere where higher education institutions find themselves, has some ways to go.

2. The Higher Education System under racial oligarchy

The Nationalist Party state introduced a new interventionist character into the relations between state and civil society as it relates to the terrain of higher education. Under Apartheid, the state was re-designed to organize civil society more firmly along the lines of "race" and ethnicity. This translated into an administrative practice where all social services were provided separately and unequally. Each ethnic group required its own department, creating an enormous administrative and policing bureaucracy. There were departments of

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1 One of the new popular concepts in the language of higher education policy post 1994 is that of “system.” This word has multiple meanings in its usage but in contrast to the large philosophical and social science debate surrounding this term, in South Africa it has received very little or no critical attention. In the South African policy debates it tends to refer to order, structure and arrangement. The tendency is to identify features of the HE system and this move includes comparing the HAI’s and HDI’s, identifying the common and different features of each group, and largely discussing how each responds to the demands defined as crucial to contemporary South African society. It tends to be a “globalisation” related discourse. Somewhat contrasting this more conservative, mechanical conception of “system”, is the view that sees it as a standpoint, frame of reference, or worldview. In this view the HE system does not really exist, it is considered a heuristic device or metaphor that helps frame our discussion on higher education issues. The emphasis is on social transformation and the values drawn from the highpoint of the anti-Apartheid struggle are emphasized. Lastly, there are those who would avoid the use of the term completely, finding it for a variety of different reasons unhelpful to discuss higher education issues.
Native, Indian, and Coloured Affairs; and further sub-departments to deal with education, health, welfare and other services. The Bantustans (which ought to be considered as adjunct organs of the central state) further extended this bureaucratic network to dominate and monitor the population within its territories. The project was designed to establish and consolidate white identity and the economic, social and cultural domination by whites of the polity. Those classified as “non-whites” were expected to labour to serve white society and culturally assume roles and practices expressing subordination to secure the basis of white privilege and superiority. The program of racially determining social relations allowed the state to centralize, administer and uniformly impose its ideology on educational policy in line with its Apartheid project.

The ideological functions of educational policy under Apartheid were designed to fit with the Apartheid social arrangement of society: it distributed educational resources unequally on the basis of "race", its objective was to "teach" subaltern youth that their Otherness (inferiority) was "natural", it aimed to imbue the subaltern child with an "ethnic" (tribal) cultural identity with the hope that it would identify with "its own" people and ethnically defined Bantustan, it aimed to constitute thoroughly docile subjects whose will to resist would be crushed and policed by themselves, and finally it aimed to establish two "types" of subaltern political classes--a small elite to operate the administrative structures of the subaltern (in the Bantustans and urban areas) and a labouring class to perform unskilled labour for the industrial economy (Reddy, 2000). A differentiated higher education terrain was produced in keeping with the imperatives of the Grand Apartheid project. The unintended consequence was that the black universities created conditions that led to the emergence of student resistance. The latter helped create and sustain the internal resistance movement and together with structural factors (economic contradictions, regional changes and global pressures) helped produce the collapse of the Apartheid regime.

2.1. A Differentiated Higher Education Sector

The striking feature of higher education in South Africa is that its provision evolved and reproduced itself along racial and ethnic lines, prompted in large measure by deliberate state policy. It is imperative therefore to acknowledge that the emergence, roles, and cultures of universities in contemporary South Africa relate quite directly to the history of white political, economic and cultural domination and consequently higher education reflects the history of unequal relations of power perpetuated during colonial and Apartheid rule (Wolpe, 1991, Nkomo, 1990, Badat, 1999). Governments prior to World War 2 considered higher education to be a privilege exclusive to white society.

Nearly a hundred years after the establishment of the first universities for whites, a university for black South Africans, Fort Hare, was established in 1916. The University of the Cape of Good Hope, the first white higher education institution, functioned as the administrative examining board, similar to the University of London, for the colleges of the Cape. These colleges were preparatory high schools for the colonial elite who went to Europe for university education. These early colleges inspired the establishment of universities. The South African College (SACS) founded in 1829 evolved by 1918 into a fully recognised university, the University of Cape Town. Afrikaner elites determined to establish their own university as part of their nationalist cause and conflict with the English, opened Victoria College in 1865, renamed Stellenbosch University in 1918 (Ade Ajayi, 1996, Cooper, 2001). Following the settlement of English immigrants in 1820, Rhodes University was established in the Eastern Cape. A School of Mines University in Johannesburg followed the mining revolution on the Rand. It opened in 1895, and became in 1922 the
University of the Witwatersrand. The federally organised University of South Africa (UNISA) had branch colleges around the country, serving these as the examining board, and from the 1930's onwards these affiliated colleges became independent universities, resulting in the Universities of Natal, Pretoria, Potchefstroom, and Free State (Ade Ajayi, 1996). All these institutions, save Fort Hare, served the white ruling classes.

When the Nationalist Party government assumed power in 1948 the number of black students enrolled at universities stood at a mere 4.8% (Badat, 1991:48), mostly enrolled at the University of Fort Hare. This low number was typical for colonised Africa. The colonising administrations were reluctant to provide education to Africans. Eventually, primary education was grudgingly provided, yet Africans were consistently denied access to higher education. The ruling elites feared that higher education would produce anti-colonial and anti-racist resistance sentiments. This thinking was not too far off the mark, for the principal of Fort Hare, Mr Alexander Kerr, observed that his students were “obsessed with topics like the franchise, the colour bar and social segregation in public amenities and conveyances...They had a passionate faith in the efficacy of education to make good these and similar deficiencies” (Ade Ajayi, 1996:36). The continued denial of higher education to Africans made it an important demand of the broader struggle against colonial domination (Ade Ajayi, 1996).

In South Africa during the initial decades of colonial rule the state refused to provide education for Africans. Christian Missions established primary schools and later high schools. The case of Fort Hare illustrates the states reluctance to support higher education for Africans. It took decades before Fort Hare received financial support from the state and South African business. James Stewart, the head of Lovedale College, proposed the idea of an African university in 1904 to the Colonial Native Affairs Commission. Identifying the need for trained African teachers, the Commission accepted the proposal. Initial funding was slow. The Presbyterian Mission gave 5 000 pounds. The Transkeian Territories General Council donated 10 000 pounds. The central Union government, after some years, contributed a paltry 600 pounds. The college, first referred to as the Inter-State Native College, later renamed the South African Native College, opened with 18 African men, 2 African women, and 2 white students. The college was allowed to sit for the University of South Africa (UNISA) exams in 1923; only the white faculty were recognised as internal examiners. A donation of 75 000 pounds from the Chamber of Mines in 1935 allowed the college to expand, establishing faculties of science and medical education (Ade Ajayi, 1996). The administration remained under the control of the missions without much support from the state until the Apartheid regime stepped in.

Instead of denying university education to blacks by relying on the admissions policies of the established white universities, the Apartheid state embarked on a determined policy to create universities for the variously state defined ethnically classified black groups. These new universities, the “bush colleges,” were designed to serve as valuable instruments in the over-arching “grand Apartheid” political project based on the creation of psuedo-independent states in the African “tribal” reserves. For Zulu and Swazi speakers the government created the University of Zululand. The University of the North was created for Sotho, Tswana, Venda, Tsonga speakers and the Transvaal Ndebele. The universities of the Western Cape and Durban-Westville were created for those classified Coloureds and Indians by the state (Horrell, 1968). By the early 1970’s universities were established in the Transkei, Bophuthatswana, and Venda Bantustans. These institutions were expected to legitimate, reproduce, and constitute, especially among the elites, identities and social relations of race and ethnicity. If successful, this project would divide the black majority
into many minorities, weakening both the physical majority and the political, moral argument for democratic majority rule in an undivided South Africa.

The racial differentiation of universities comfortably replicated the racial organisation prevailing in society. Society resembled an inflexible hierarchical structure, modelled like a pyramid with a minority classified as whites at the top and a large majority of blacks categorised by state policy into Africans, Coloured and Indian “groups” at the bottom. The Coloured and Indian groups were deliberately and controversially positioned to constitute what Van den Berghe calls “middle-man minorities” (Van den Berghe, 1987). Notwithstanding the verbal claims of administrators at the English language universities to have opposed Apartheid policies, the application of racially restrictive admissions criteria established by state policy and vigilantly policed at university level helped produce universities for Whites, Africans (divided into separate language groups), Indians, and Coloureds.

As products of a central state vision, the historically black universities initially shared many common features marking them differently to the historically white institutions. Over time similar cultures of university administration, cooperation between student organizations and experiences of struggle and conflict, gave firmer foundations to claims of a common collective identity. History, culture, politics and conscious efforts by university elites created common institutional identities among the English and Afrikaner language universities respectively.

The legacy of Apartheid state planning is the racial and ethnically fragmented higher education sector (Badat, 1999, Badat, 2002) 2. To speak of a single, homogenous higher education system is to over-generalise, misrepresent, and undervalue the past. At the time of the democratic transition the higher education “system” was composed of 21 universities and 15 technikons. We must be cautious when referring to this ensemble of institutions as a “system” where the latter denotes a mechanical arrangement of universities, colleges and technikons certifying advanced “knowledge and skills.” The system’s identity is at best quite tenuous. The differences between the units are fundamental and arguably more meaningful than their unifying “system” features. Through state policies, unequal funding, racially skewed student and staff composition, institutional histories, support from business, regional and local cultures in the surrounding environments of universities, and the varying impacts of the evolving social relations of power in the broader society, the higher education terrain displays marked differences in status, everyday material conditions, and capacities between those universities the education discourses of the new South Africa have come to label “historically advantaged” and those “historically disadvantaged” universities. The racially and ethnically differentiated configuration of universities resulted in institutions performing different roles in the overall system of domination, expressing different institutional capacities and cultures, and participating in different ways in the struggle against the Apartheid regime. To emphasise the differentiated identities of higher education institutions under Apartheid is to avoid referring to a broadly conceived role of higher education institutions in general; universities and units within universities played different roles in relation to the Apartheid power structure. The very notion of a university having a homogenous institutional culture is subject to persuasive critique.

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1 Engaging, acknowledging, re-presenting, and contesting the past lies at the heart of contemporary understandings of politics in South Africa. The higher education sector is not immune from this discussion. It is no coincidence, no surprise, that the terms used to name and categorise higher education institutions revolve on the “historical.”
2.2. State Re-structuring of Civil Society: White Universities

The National Party mandated the Eiselen Commission, which released its report in 1951, to develop an educational policy for Black South Africans that was in line with the separate development project of Afrikaner nationalism. The Commission was asked to investigate any aspect of education for “Natives as an independent race, in which their past and present, their inherent racial qualities, their distinctive characteristics and aptitude, and their needs under ever-changing social conditions are taken into consideration” (Behr, 1988:32). The mandate made specific reference to the training of teachers and to “prepare Natives more effectively for their future occupations” (Behr, 1988: 32).

The Commission proposed that the state should assume absolute control over African education under a newly created Department of Bantu Education. This meant removing control from religious bodies (Behr, 1988)\(^3\). The commission called for more input from local communities who would eventually bear the brunt of financing their children’s education. At the ideological level the Commission recognised the important role education could play in creating and reproducing particular types of racial and ethnic identities. It reiterated that education had to instil a sense of “race” pride and that the content of education be embedded within the cultural dimension of Africans as a “race.” While this notion of “race” as the fundamental starting point from which state policy derived had a long tradition within South African politics, the Commission gave it a more focussed, systematic, and administrative footing. Before this, state policy was ambiguously divided between seeking to “westernise” indigenous people and leaving “native” culture untouched without any state involvement in education at all. Instead, the Eiselen commission proposed that state directed education be rooted in specifically African “race culture,” conceived as a primordial essence.

Verwoerd further expanded on the "philosophy" guiding state thinking on subaltern education, specifically linking the state’s conception of education with the social development of racial groups, all of which had its place within a grand Apartheid vision.

It is the policy of my department that (Bantu) education should have its roots entirely in the Native areas and in the Native environment and Native community. Bantu education must be able to give itself complete expression and there it will have to perform its real service. The Bantu must be guided to serve his own community in all respects. There is no place for him in the European community above the level of certain forms of labour. Within his own community, however, all doors are open. For that reason it is of no avail for him to receive a training which has as its aim absorption in the European community while he cannot and will not be absorbed there. Up till now he has been subjected to a school system which drew him away from his own community and practically misled him by showing him the green pastures of the European but still did not allow him to graze there. This attitude is not only uneconomic because money is spent on education which has no specific aim, but it is even dishonest to continue with it. The effect on the Bantu community we find in the much-discussed frustration of

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\(^3\) In 1954 education for Africans was moved from the control of the Christian missions and placed under the Department of Bantu Education.
educated Natives who can find no employment which is acceptable to them (Behr, 1988: 36).

When I have control of Native Education I will reform it so that the Natives will be taught from childhood to realise that equality with Europeans is not for them...People who believe in equality are not desirable teachers for Natives...When my department controls Native education it will know for what class of higher education a Native is fitted, and whether he will have a chance in life to use his knowledge...What is the use of teaching the Bantu child mathematics when it cannot use it in practice? That is quite absurd (Hirson, 1979: 45).

In the 1960's Apartheid planners implemented the vision of education to higher education outlined in the Extension of University Education Act of 1959. This Act reconfigured the existing higher education sector by steering black enrolment away from the established white universities and creating black universities, qualitatively different to the white universities, to which black students were forced to attend. The state led initiative produced remarkable compliance from the established universities. In October 1959 the government gazetted that from the following year no “non-white” person would be permitted to attend any university (except the University of Natal Medical School and the University of South Africa) without the permission of the Minister. The following year the government specified that from December 1960 no African would be allowed to study at an “open university.”

The Minister insisted that black students should attend the newly established black universities instead and only under exceptional circumstances, such as unavailability of a course at a black institution, would he consider allowing a black student to attend a white university.

The English language universities registered a sharp decline in black student numbers. These universities had always discriminated against black students, for even in the two institutions Wits and UCT that allowed black students to attend non-segregated lectures, segregated student residences and sporting facilities existed. The other white universities had separate lectures for black students (Nkomo, 1990). A year after the legislation was passed, 190 African students applied for admission to the “open” universities. The Minister of Bantu Education granted permission to four students, yet astonishingly only two of the four students were admitted, one each to the universities of Cape Town and Witwatersrand.

4 Black students could not enroll for the following disciplines at the open universities: Chemistry, Physics, Zoology, Botany, Mathematics, Applied Mathematics, Geography, Psychology, Agriculture, Afrikaans, English, History, Economics, Commerce, Sociology, Social Work, Anthropology, Native Administration, Bantu Languages, Classical Languages, Philosophy, Political Science, Law or Divinity or in the Faculty of Education. (Horrell, 1968).

5 Despite calls to boycott the black colleges by the Unity Movement and other progressive organisations, black students grudgingly and gradually enrolled.

6 The Apartheid State relied on legislation, support of state ideology, and on funding to canalise admissions on racial and ethnic grounds. For example, as it relates to the Natal Medical School, the government transferred 15 bursaries that used to be given to students at the University of Witwatersrand to the Natal Medical School. The government awarded bursaries to African students. If, according to the regulation, it could not find suitably qualified African applicants, the bursaries were offered to Coloured and then Indian students. The scholarship recipients who practiced in South Africa paid half the bursary back with interest; those who practiced outside South Africa had to pay back the full bursary (Horrell, 1968:117).

7 The numbers of black students admitted were outrageously small. According to the National Commission of Higher Education (NCHE) report, the existence of discriminatory practices historically was not based on policy: “Prior to this Act the existing universities catered largely for whites. Although there was no legislation barring black people from any university at that point, universities were differentiated by race.”
The universities rejected the other two applications on academic grounds (Horrell, 1968:115); in effect, in the entire country only two African students entered the “open universities.”

The following table illustrates the drop in admissions at the white universities after the legislation in 1959.

### Table 1: Enrolment of African Students at Selected White Universities 1954-1968

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<td>755</td>
<td>1354</td>
<td>1552</td>
<td>1408</td>
<td>1457</td>
<td>1766</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>2404</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Horrell, 1968: 116)

While the numbers of African students admitted to UCT and Witwatersrand were low historically, an astonishing drop follows the passing of Apartheid legislation: At UCT 39 African students registered in 1959, dropping to 18 in 1961 (46% drop) and 5 in 1965, the height of Apartheid. At the University of Witwatersrand, African student numbers dropped from 74 in 1959, to 38 in 1961 (51% drop) and 10 in 1965. In both cases admissions of African students dropped by nearly 50% after the passing of the Apartheid legislation. The enrolment figures for Natal University inflates the number of African students because, unlike UCT and Wits, it includes students from its all black Medical School.8 In keeping with government legislation, the university created the medical faculty to train “non-whites” in 1951, admitting in the first year of study 12 African students, 2 Coloured and 20 Indian students. The students did their practical training at the black King Edward VIII hospital. (Horrell, 1968:117).9

Oddly, these universities and insider accounts of them tend to offer a re-presentation of their institutional histories that only highlights their anti-Apartheid stand. The UCT website characterises itself during the Apartheid years as follows, “Apart from establishing itself as a leading research and teaching university in the decades that followed, the period 1960 to 1990 was marked by sustained opposition to apartheid, particularly in higher education” (www.uct.ac.za). In a similar vein Wits describes a glowing anti-Apartheid stance: “From the outset, [it] was founded as an open university with a policy of non-discrimination - on racial or any other grounds. This commitment faced its ultimate test when the apartheid-government passed the Extension of the University Education Act in 1959, thereby enforcing university apartheid. The Wits community protested strongly and continued to maintain a firm, consistent and vigorous stand against apartheid, not only in education, but in all its manifestations. These protests were sustained as more and more civil liberties were withdrawn and peaceful opposition to apartheid was suppressed. The consequences for the

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8 In relation to the overall racial differentiation of higher education institutions, the Natal Medical School represented an ambiguously defined entity. It was a racially segregated black faculty in a white university; the main university did admit a few black students but they had to sit for segregated lectures, apart from their white counterparts.

9 In 1968 130 Africans, 209 Indians and 31 Coloured students were registered at the Medical School; a disproportionate number of places were given to Indian students in comparison to African and Coloured students. In 1968 110 Africans, 111 Indian, 1 Chinese and 12 Coloured students completed their degrees. Just 8 students went on to receive Masters Degrees; no African students were in this group. (Horrell, 1968:117).
University were severe - banning, deportation and detention of staff and students, as well as invasions of the campus by riot police to disrupt peaceful protest meetings.” (www.wits.ac.za). The claims of these institutions as implacably opposed to Apartheid policy and that, at the institutional level, they undermined the state’s racial discriminatory policies is inaccurate. The general compliance of these universities with state policy surprises and is difficult to explain given the autonomy exercised by these institutions, contested though this was, between the state and themselves. It might be that these institutions were unprepared to oppose the state for fear of the social penalties they would attract from the white constituencies that traditionally supported them. More likely these institutions shared the dominant practices and values of the racist society of which they were a part. Consequently, it was not very difficult for universities that had a history of reluctantly accepting black students to cooperate with Nationalist Party policy.

2.3. State Re-structuring of Civil Society: The Emergence of the “Bush Colleges”

The architecture of the black universities is revealing. It consisted of a balance between new, modernist buildings that, in the context of historical deprivation would attract new students and certainly impress their parents, and tactically designed to prevent, undermine and control possible student protest. Clearly modernist in expression, peppered with Roman columns here and there, the buildings were drab: cold concrete, low rise, with an effective “office block” look and feel. The Administration buildings assumed prominence, almost always near the entrance of the university, but also providing a strategic space from which to assert its panopticon-like eye throughout the campus. A “Great Hall” and the main library enclosed the central square, a space for students to gather and socialise in-between lectures. Some distance away from the main campus stand the student residences, separate for male and female students. These consisted of single rooms for senior students and double rooms for junior students, “all with built-in cupboards, desks, and bookshelves (Horrell, 1968:119)”. The movement into and outside residences and between male and female residences was strictly policed. The sporting facilities would impress, particularly as it provided a stark contrast to the total absence of sports facilities in the black residential areas. Because students grudgingly entered these universities a boycott of sports facilities on campus was the first political campaign and the immaculate facilities remained unused for many years (until in the late 1980’s when SANSCO decided to adopt the strategy of using sports facilities to mobilise students who wanted to play sports). A strictly controlled, well-guarded entrance monitored traffic into and out of the university property, the latter surrounded by high, barbed-wire fencing more closely resembling a prison than a university. The local campus police, responsible for monitoring and watching over students developed a notorious reputation and were predictably the first targets of student aggression.

The emergence of the black universities marked an important change in the characteristics of white domination. There was a break with the historical exclusionary practice of ignoring black demands for access to higher education and relying on the elitist white universities (all of which patterned themselves on the British elitist model of higher education) to admit qualified black candidates. These practices resulted in an insignificantly small number of black students in higher education, a small minority that, despite its heroic efforts, could hardly make a major social, political and cultural impact on the black community experience.

The new colleges broke the institutional foundations of this type of narrow elitism. A “mass-based” elitism unfolded, an elite that was more likely to impact on the community at large followed the increased numbers of black students in universities with black students
from different backgrounds and different parts of the country. Interestingly, the De Wet Nel Commission to draw up the Separate University Bill consciously worked with the notion of creating an elite that would identify with its own ethnic group, what Horowitz calls “ethnic entrepreneurs.” The commission saw the role of the black universities as encouraging each student “to play an active part, and train them in all facets of the process of development of the life of their group. The students should be the pioneers in the whole process of civilizing the ethnic group concerned.” (Nkomo, 1984: 60) The elite that eventually did take form distanced itself vehemently from all notions of ethnicity (especially at the political level), and instead embraced the idea of a larger community, the undivided oppressed group.

While the low numbers of black students at the white universities dropped further, the development of the “bush colleges” increased the number of black students studying for higher degrees. Against the background of calls to boycott these institutions at first and despite the courageous sacrifices of certain individuals refusing to support “Apartheid institutions”, black students slowly and anxiously filtered into the new black universities. The students, given their poor schooling preparation in the natural sciences, the availability of many more programmes in the humanities and education fields and in many cases no programmes in the natural sciences at all, concentrated in the humanities and education fields (Badat, 1998:3).

The table below shows the increasing enrolment at the University Colleges from 1960 to 1968.

**Table 2: Enrolments at Selected Black Universities 1960-1968**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Fort Hare</th>
<th>U of North</th>
<th>Zululand</th>
<th>UWC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>360</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>156</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>344</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>213</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>242</td>
<td>194</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>239</td>
<td>248</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>272</td>
<td>305</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>317</td>
<td>389</td>
<td>243</td>
<td>416</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>402</td>
<td>460</td>
<td>299</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>436</td>
<td>537</td>
<td>341</td>
<td>560</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>451</td>
<td>611</td>
<td>368</td>
<td>669</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Horrell, 1968: 125, SAIRR)

In the eight years between 1960 and 1968, student numbers increased by 91 at Fort Hare, 524 at the University of the North, 327 in Zululand and 513 at UWC. Essentially to legitimise the Apartheid project, the ironic effect was that more black students were taking higher education degrees than anytime previously. Although starting at a very low figure in relation to the white student population and in relation to the proportion of blacks making up the total South African population the black student population increased with each year after 1960 (actual number, relative to the total student population). Interestingly, if one accepts the claim of Cooper and Subotzky (2002) that South African higher education experienced a “revolution” in black student admissions to higher education institutions in the 1990's with increases from 32% in 1990 to 60% in 2000, the increases between 1960 and 1968 at the bush colleges will also constitute something of a “revolution” because at the University of the North, Zululand and UWC, black student numbers increased by 83% over the period.
The state succeeded in steering students to the universities designated for the ethnic group to which they were classified (Badat, 1998). The following table illustrates this shift numerically.

Table 3: Ethnic Classification and Student Enrolment at the Black Universities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>African</th>
<th>Coloured</th>
<th>Indian</th>
<th>White</th>
<th>UNISA</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>488</td>
<td>161</td>
<td>1728</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>4381</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Dist</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>---14.8---</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>39.4</td>
<td>45.8</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>956</td>
<td>416</td>
<td>1009</td>
<td>981</td>
<td>2911</td>
<td>6273</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Dist</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>15.6</td>
<td>46.4</td>
<td></td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>936</td>
<td>1654</td>
<td>1106</td>
<td>3704</td>
<td>9411</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Dist</td>
<td>48.9</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>11.8</td>
<td>39.3</td>
<td></td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>5204</td>
<td>2438</td>
<td>3108</td>
<td>1550</td>
<td>10609</td>
<td>22.909</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Dist</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>---46.9---</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>46.3</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Of the total distribution of all students in the higher education system, 14.8% were enrolled in the ethnic universities in 1960. By 1976 this percentage increased to 46.9%.

The state was apparently aware of the danger posed by the increased numbers of black students entering universities. It suspected the possibility of student protest. The looming contradiction here is best comprehended in terms of the ideological trade-off that existed: There certainly was the goal, value and hope that the new institutions would inculcate an intense ethnic identity and consequent identification of students with their ethnic “homelands.” This was too important a need, almost a structural imperative of the political order. Yet also evident was the caution and worry of political cooperation and mobilization across institutions, which the state sought to prevent by repressing dissent at every turn.

It located these universities in rural settings, far from centres that might attract students to critical cultural and political activity. The idea was to keep a distance from “politics”, to have students narrowly focus their attention on their studies without them asking broader questions about Apartheid society; the state assumed that political activism was only really attributable to the urban context. The University of the North was located 18 miles from Pietersburg, the main urban centre in the then Northern Transvaal (Horrell, 1968). The University of the Western Cape, although located on the Cape Flats where Coloured and African working class areas are located, was surrounded by vast spaces of open, uninhabited, barren land, making any contact with the surrounding communities difficult. Similarly, the University of Durban-Westville was located alongside the white middle class suburb of Westville, on two hills, surrounding by deep ravines and valleys.

A quick glance at the rules gazetted between 1959 and 1960 relating to the black universities suggests how different these were from “normal” universities, despite the efforts of the state to “market” them as such to the relevant communities:

1. “Students may not leave the college precincts without permission from the Hostel Superintendent or a representative duly authorized by the Rector;
2. Any students organization or organizational work in which students are concerned is subject to the prior approval of the Rector;
3. No meetings may be held in the grounds of the college without permission from the Rector. Approved student committees may meet in accordance with the rules of the constitution of the body concerned;

4. No magazine, publication or pamphlet for which students are wholly or partly responsible may be circulated without the permission of the Rector in consultation with the Advisory Senate and the Senate;

5. No statement may be given to the Press by or on behalf of the students without the Rector’s permission” (Horrell, 1968:121)

6. At Fort Hare students had to re-apply for admission and the application had to include a “testimonial of good conduct by a Minister of Religion or a Bantu Affairs Commissioner or Magistrate of the district where the applicant normally resides” (Horrell, 1968:121). This became a regular rule at all Black institutions following student boycotts. The University of the North required students to produce a testimonial that was to the “satisfaction of the authorities.” In many cases returning students had to sign new contracts with the university promising not to participate in political activities, that their parents will be held responsible for damages, and that their parents would be charged the full fees for the semester in which they may be expelled.

These rules placed enormous power in the office of the Rector, who was invariably a leading member of the Nationalist Party and Broederbond. The senior positions at these institutions were given to faculty from the Afrikaans universities or high-ranking civil servants in the Department of Bantu Affairs. Generally, the entire teaching staff came from the Afrikaner institutions; many young Afrikaner graduates began careers in these institutions because of the unavailability of vacancies in the established Afrikaner universities. Most of the teaching faculty and staff tended to be politically conservative, card-carrying members of the ruling party, and vigilantly displayed a policing, authoritative, and demeaning attitude towards the students. The teaching curriculum fitted comfortably within a positivist, Christian National Education paradigm (Enslin, 1984).

The table below indicates the numbers of academics in the different categories, comparing white and black staff numbers at the black universities in 1972.10

Table 4: Staff Profile at Black Universities in 1972

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>University</th>
<th>Professors</th>
<th>Senior Lecturers</th>
<th>Lecturers</th>
<th>Junior Lecturers</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Black</td>
<td>White</td>
<td>Black</td>
<td>White</td>
<td>Black</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fort Hare</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U of North</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UWC</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zululand</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UDW</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>9</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>176</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Black Review 1972: 173)

Out of 563 academic staff there were only 9 black professors, 12 black senior lecturers and just 63 lecturers. By contrast there were 111 white professors, 176 white senior lecturers and

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10 This characteristic has remained a feature of South African universities ever since, and is another of the major challenges facing the new government.
160 white lecturers. The key personnel in the University Council and senior management level were entirely white. They appeared to the students as the direct representatives of the state on the campuses. The black academics were in a difficult position. Occupying positions of some respect in apartheid-created institutions, they were caught in the middle between the growing radicalisation of students and the watchful eye of the university management. Besides, they had their own struggles and frustrations as black academics in deeply discriminatory university contexts. Some identified with the political demands of the students. Others were passive participants, as is always the case in such situations, wanting to get on with their jobs without getting involved in “politics”. The more militant black consciousness activists looked upon this group suspiciously, unless they took a visible stand against the university authorities or identified with the emerging student and community politics.

The development of black universities, increased student numbers, and the repressive and conservative cultures within these institutions failed to successfully establish social control in keeping with the visions of the architects of higher education planning. Ironically, the growth of black university student numbers between 1960 and 1976 studying courses in the humanities and education, the repressive conditions on the black campuses, and the conservative stance of the teaching staff created the conditions that contributed to student unrest. After an initial period of passivity, increasing student frustration and alienation produced student organisations and campaigns for university reforms. Student boycotts became so frequent that by the mid-1980’s the black universities could be defined as places of perpetual “unrest.” The rising middle class finding prospective avenues closed, frustrated by the racist social order, and imbued by the culture of a nationalist resistance, assumed a ready and dynamic role in the processes of resistance and transformation in South Africa. By the 1980’s the black tertiary education sector constituted a vibrant terrain of conflict with the Apartheid state.

3. The Political Struggle against Apartheid: Student Politics

At the time of the Soweto uprisings in 1976 three trends, all contributing to the development of student organisations and resistance, are identifiable. First, black student numbers increased at the universities providing the immediate basis for political mobilisation and truly effective mass protest. Second, the comprehensive separation of students into ethnic institutions and the visibly repressive atmosphere prevailing at the black university colleges in stark contrast to the established white universities, which more closely resembled the “normal” university, alienated, angered and frustrated black students. The differences in the material conditions on the campuses constituted another basis for common “black” student identification and mobilisation. Third, the ‘new’ institutional vision of the higher education system, designed to reproduce Apartheid social relations, especially its objective to constitute ethnic subaltern subjects, produced new, protest-based identities derived from the spread of black consciousness ideas and practices. Indeed, a convincing correlation exists between the emergence of the emphasis on a new black identity and black solidarity and the material conditions prevailing in the ethnic universities.

3.1. Progressive Constituencies and Practices Aligned to the Student Struggle

Because black students constituted a “social force” that interacted directly with community structures of resistance during the national uprisings from the mid-1970’s onwards, the
primary focus of our discussion is on student politics. The intention however is not to ignore, marginalize and undermine the roles of other constituent actors within higher educations who contributed significantly to the internal resistance movements. Notable here are the few, but crucial contexts “won over” by progressive groups at the mainly white liberal campuses which served as important “protected spaces” for resistance activity, discussion, and debate (especially in the 1970’s and 1980’s). In the rare instance almost entire academic departments (often in sociology and/or history) assumed progressive stances, sympathising with the national political struggle. The curricula of these departments challenged conventional, traditional, and modernization analyses of South African history and social order. In History, the subject most closely and emotively associated with the ideological imperatives of the Apartheid state and counter narratives of subaltern resistance, an intense debate between Afrikaner, Liberal and Marxist historiography erupted in the 1970’s. Many young, white academics who pursued postgraduate studies at British universities, returned to the English-speaking universities (and some “bush colleges”) having been exposed to and influenced by Marxist (structuralist and social history) perspectives. These intellectuals applied Marxist analysis to the study of South African history, and by the late 1970’s an impressively large body of work advocating the centrality of the emergence of capitalism in the late 19th century and class struggle assumed prominence in some circles of the academy. In addition to the earlier radical scholarship already present in the traditions of the ANC, PAC and Unity Movement, Marxist understandings of the Apartheid state and society became dominant frameworks within which “struggle” languages expressed themselves. As the forces of anti-Apartheid grew post-1976, the dissemination of university based progressive academic literature providing alternative frameworks of understanding and interpretation made an important impact, adding to the vibrancy of debate associated with the period.

In some cases individual progressive academics carved out within university structures spaces for alternative, anti-Apartheid activity. This took the form of including in coursework articles by famous academics in exile such as Harold Wolpe, Baruch Hirson, and Martin Legassick, organising seminars addressing politically sensitive topics, and inviting known political activists to speak at university gatherings. Those academics more deeply embedded in the liberation movement, such as Richard Turner, Neil Agget and Eddie Webster, pursued an individual agenda of assisting, organising, and participating directly in the various resistance campaigns blurring the lines between university and resistance practices. An interesting example is that of the Wages Commission based at the University of Natal. Formed in the early 1970’s by students and staff the group played an important role in conducting work on the state of labour relations in the country, as well as, developing strong ties of solidarity with the emerging trade union movement. Besides these expressions of university-based activism, black and white intellectuals with strong ties to individual universities actively used the university as a space to pursue resistance work. These took the forms of producing community based magazines/journals such as Work In Progress, directly producing popular articles on various issues of resistance politics and disseminated via community publications, and creating and participating in interest based organisations to organise university based academic constituencies.

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11 This work emphasized class and capitalist relations and in so doing set off an intense debate concerning the relationship between race and class factors in our understanding of the nature of Apartheid domination and the most appropriate strategies to overcome it.

12 The research produced within university structures escaped beyond narrow fora, as one would observe in the range of publications reflecting an academic, yet populist character which had widespread distribution. For example Work in Progress.
Notwithstanding that extensive research remains to be conducted documenting and analysing the activity of the various constituents other than students who made and utilised certain spaces within universities for resistance activity, the following section describes the state of student resistance in the 1960’s. It traces the political and social conditions that produced the resurgence in widespread student mobilization, influencing the contours of political struggle in the broader society. The first part discusses the politics within the National Union of South African Students (NUSAS), followed by an overview of black student political activity at the mainly black universities from the 1970’s.

3.2. NUSAS and Black Students

The main student organisation, the National Union of South African Students (NUSAS) was formed in 1924. It was a predominantly white student organization, including English and Afrikaner students of the nine white universities. In its formative years NUSAS focussed mainly on uniting English and Afrikaner students; at the ideological level this involved accommodating English conservative liberalism and Afrikaner Christian nationalism. The political debates in white politics between the pro-British position of Smuts, the moderate Afrikaner nationalism of Hertzog and the radical ethnic nationalism of Malan, reflected themselves in NUSAS. Afrikaner students left the organisation and formed first the Afrikaanse Nasionale Studentebond (ANS) and later, the Afrikaanse Studentebond (ASB). NUSAS was left with English students who embraced a conservative liberalism under the influence of the United Party.

In the 1950’s NUSAS’ adopted a non-racial stance bringing it into conflict with the Nationalist government and its educational policies of Christian national education for whites and education of servitude for blacks. The organization opposed the implementation of Bantu Education in 1954 and the Extension of University Education Act in 1959, creating separate universities for blacks and the restructuring of Fort Hare.13 The NUSAS leadership was torn between the radical demands of black students and its conservative student membership.14 Black student leaders were unhappy that NUSAS concentrated too much on narrow academic matters, such as the erosion of "academic freedom" (Davies, 1988:282) and did not address itself to the larger political questions facing the country.

NUSAS developed an ambiguous relationship to black students. The organization rejected the request from students of Fort Hare to join in 1933 (Davies, 1988: 381). After World War 2, against the background of anti-fascist sentiment and the resurgence of African protests in the country, NUSAS opened its membership to black students from Fort Hare. About the same time black politics shifted towards a radical Africanist nationalism, expressed in the founding of the Youth League of the African National Congress led by Anton Lembede, and eventually the Pan Africanist Congress. This ideology emphasised African unity and culture, opposed alliances with white organizations, and saw little merit in the South African liberal tradition. However, during the intensely repressive period in the

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13 The English language universities were essentially conservative, and although NUSAS professed a liberal outlook, very few white students actually questioned Apartheid. On the campuses, voting for SRC elections did not exceed more than a quarter of the student body. The small minority of active NUSAS members found it challenging to engage the large inactive, conservative mass of white students. Its protest was consequently largely symbolic.

14 Two tendencies emerged in the NUSAS leadership: a radical liberal wing wanted NUSAS to assume a more active role in the political struggle of blacks; a liberal/conservative wing wanted the organization to restrict itself to primarily student issues and concerns, which gained influence in the sixties.
mid-1960s that follows the Sharpeville shootings, no comparative student organization existed for black students. Many black students decided to work within NUSAS.

A prominent conflict surrounding the recognition of racially exclusive clubs on campus brought such tensions into the open. This issue reflects the frustrating political atmosphere that black students were up against. It revealed the limitations of NUSAS and its focus on white student concerns as well as the racism of university administrations. In July 1967, Conservative students from the main English campuses met in Johannesburg and decided to form a national organisation for white students. Shortly thereafter the South African Students Union was launched at UCT to serve as the real union of white students in opposition to NUSAS which they accused of pandering to the few blacks in its membership. The previous year the Conservation Students Association (CSA) launched a local branch at UCT restricted to whites. NUSAS did not accept it for affiliation, rejecting its racially defined constitution. The government, not unsurprisingly, supporting the trend towards white exclusivist organisations on the English campuses and initiated the Universities Amendment Bill and the Extension of University Education Amendment bill. The first bill, if passed, would over-rule the NUSAS objection as it protected any person advocating or promoting any form of racial separation. The second bill prohibited the admission of any black person to a white university without ministerial permission and prevented any black student from joining student organisations except those belonging to his/her own ethnic group or those restricted to academic matters (SAIRR, 1967: 281).

The UCT administration, in early 1967 appointed a commission under the chairmanship of Mr Justice M.A.P. Diemont to investigate student bodies. The commission favoured a less political, anti-government NUSAS. It drew up a new SRC constitution accepting clubs and societies whose membership was racially discriminatory, provided the club presented reasons for its restrictive membership. The University Council accepted the new constitution. Realising the university administrations were acting in accordance with government thinking, the Minister of Education withdrew the proposed Bills saying that they were no longer necessary (SAIRR, 1967: 281).

To black students, assigned to the inferior university colleges ("bush colleges"), scattered far and wide in the rural areas, the issue of racially exclusive campus clubs affiliated to NUSAS signalled the conservative shift in white student politics and the general endorsement by white students of the racial social structure. Besides, these students were faced with a host of politically related issues: security police harassment, spies on campus, non-representation through SRC's, inferior educational facilities, curricula that ignored the racial issues of the society, and poor accommodation and food at the residences. NUSAS did not campaign against these conditions. For black students the major focus was the abolition of Bantu education and radical changes in the society as a whole.

Frustrated, Steve Biko and other black delegates walked out of the 1967 NUSAS Congress in protest and launched the South African Students Organisation (SASO) a few months after leaving NUSAS. 15

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15 The proceedings of the NUSAS conference in 1967 reflected the organisation's conservative stance towards contemporary South African politics. A resolution calling on SRCs to abolish racial discrimination on the English universities was passed by 42 votes, 2 votes opposed and 20 abstentions. The congress condemned the government’s restrictions on the press, framing it as a threat to academic freedom.
3.3. SASO and Black Consciousness

An appreciation of the broad context of the 1970s in South African politics is important to put into perspective the formation of SASO and the emergence of the different message that black consciousness entailed. Some key contextual factors of this period include the following:

- An organizational and “ideological” vacuum following the bannings of the ANC and PAC;\(^{16}\)
- The draconian security conditions, a large coercive, intrusive state apparatus compelling widespread fear of “politics” (broadly defined) among black people. The pervasiveness of this fear, its manifestations and how to effectively move beyond it was imaginatively developed within black student leadership circles; the idea of a conscious “black” identity as a sign of defiance was one of the creative contributions of Black Consciousness ideology;

The success of state-led import-substitution-industrialisation policies, the economic boom of the sixties nationally and globally, produced a South African capitalism with all the contradictions relating to the close over-lapping of class, race and gender exploitation;

The ambitious "social engineering" state policy of physically separating blacks along ethnic lies in the Bantustan project that created a complicated and complex political system that was intrinsically unable to generate its own reproductive legitimacy;

The fragmented resistance from black quarters, the important, dominating political space occupied by liberals (mainly white) and the "homeland" leaders, while the society became increasingly racially polarised.

Representatives from black higher education institutions met at Mariannhill, approved the formation of SASO and publicly launched the organisation at the University of the North (Turfloop) in July 1969.\(^ {17}\) Steve Biko was unanimously elected president. SASO embarked on a series of workshops to popularise the organization. “Formation schools” (as they were

\(^{16}\) The banning of the political organisations active during the 1950’s civil disobedience campaigns affected student organisation more seriously than other areas. For black student supporters of the PAC and ANC, the exile of these organizations left them without structures to recruit students, promote their respective ideologies, and mount resistance campaigns against the regime. Yet sympathies and allegiances towards these movements never declined and the politically aware students continued to be interested in them. At Fort Hare three political movements, the larger groups of the ANC and PAC, and the relatively smaller following of the Unity Movement, competed for student support. Each group formed its own student organization: the Congress Alliance formed the African Students Association (ASA), the Africanist students, the African Students Union of South Africa (ASUSA) and the Unity Movement, the Progressive National Students Organization (PNSU). The PNSU merged the Durban Students Union and the Cape Peninsula Student Union. When the Africanists and Unity Movement students defined their organizations as "unions", they were indicating their opposition to NUSAS, characterising their organisations as alternatives to NUSAS. NUSAS however remained the only internationally recognised representative of all South African students. Unlike ASUSA and PNSU, the pro-ANC, ASA defended the role of NUSAS, considering it to be integral to the struggle for democracy and the “multi-racial” ideology it advocated.

\(^{17}\) The predecessor organisation of SASO was the University Christian Movement (UCM). From 1966 onwards many black students began to participate increasingly in the University Christian Movement (UCM), an organisation more receptive to black student opinion. The UCM started out as a multi-racial organisation and began to explore Black Consciousness ideas from a theological perspective. Between late 1966 and 1968, the year SASO was formed, the UCM served to bring black students together, help them determine their own political agenda, and provide a platform to formulate a longer-term political programme. Under conditions of fearful repression, where “deaths in detention” became more common, maintaining organisational contact was important and a Christian organisation was less likely to attract the attention of the security agencies.

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called) provided black students with forums to develop their own ideas and political programmes. At the first "formation school", held at the Natal University Medical School in December 1969, Biko talked about the significance, role and future of SASO (Stubbs, 1988: 4). The basic and immediate aims of SASO were to: 1) Mobilise black students by increasing contact nationally, 2) Identify crucial issues/grievances that affected black students, 3) Represent the interests of the black students, 4) Establish a solid and strong identity to boost black students’ confidence in themselves, and 5) Begin concrete programmes to respond to pertinent issues to get the majority of black students directly involved in SASO activities (Stubbs, 1988:4-5). Forming an independent black organisation was not a support of government policy, but was a realistic response according to Biko: what SASO has done is simply to take stock of the present scene in the country and to realise that not unless the non-white students decide to lift themselves from the doldrums will they ever hope to get out of them. What we want is not black visibility but real black participation (Stubbs, 1988:5).

The new stance allowed blacks to break their dependence on white society, to develop a confidence in themselves and to work out their own strategies and ideas about liberation. The slogan "we are 'black' students and not black 'students' popularised the importance of establishing strong ties to local communities. The attendance at the July 1970 SASO conference displayed widespread representation from most black tertiary institutions, with affiliated SRC's of the universities of the North, Fort Hare, Zululand, Natal Medical School. Where SRC structures did not exist, SASO branches were formed as at UDW and UWC.

The Black Consciousness (BC) ideology developed in close association with the practical activities of SASO. The rapid, but somewhat surprising, immediate proliferation of Black Consciousness ideas to communities via hundreds of local organisations, and the consequent resurgence in black political activity, led SASO to help initiate a national black political organisation, called the Black Peoples Convention (BPC). Its preamble suggests its intention to challenge the structures of power in the society at large since the BPC saw itself as a movement of black people, rejecting any form of tribal affiliation and ethnic mobilisation. Most SASO members became senior leaders in the BPC and Biko was made the Honorary President because of his banning order that restricted him to the King Williamstown area.

By the mid-1970s the black consciousness movement had established a host of organisations, and many community organisations already in existence, associated with its ideology. A loose, mosaic of organisations, of women, workers, students, youth, cultural arts, brick-building, pottery etc., located at local, regional and even national levels, linked in various ways to one another, contributed to creating a renaissance in black civic and political culture. It was intrinsically a culture of opposition. When the students in Soweto revolted against the imposition of Afrikaans as a medium of instruction in their schools, they were manifesting a new assertiveness that came with the cultural context of protest pervading black communities in the early 1970’s.

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18 In this presentation Biko interestingly and provocatively locates SASO in the tradition of the resistance struggle, specifically to the post-Sharpeville failures of black resistance: the lack of unity, a “cementing” ideology, weak black leadership. NUSAS was "structurally" unable to facilitate black interests and consequently the situation black students found themselves made it necessary to form an organization representing their interests, independent of whites.
Two events in the 1970’s contributed to the culture of revolt that took hold among students, youth and local communities in the 1980’s. The first was the 1972 boycotts which began at the University of the North, and the second was the 1976 Soweto rebellion. SASO campaigned against Bantu education. When the administration of the University of the North expelled Mr Onkgopotse Ramothibi Tiro, the SRC president, the students boycotted classes to demand his reinstatement. The boycott spread rapidly to other black universities. The students criticised Bantu education and the entire Apartheid political order. Against the background of a rampant, confident racist regime, widespread fear of the dreaded security police, a generalised political apathy pervading black communities and an organisational “vacuum” in black politics, the May-June 1972 student boycott was an important development in protest politics.\(^\text{19}\)

Tiro was expelled after this speech. Grossly angered, and realising that Tiro expressed their feelings of frustration and alienation from the broader social order, the students began a boycott of classes, an act whose significance looms large because the last such major act of collective student protest took place in the early 1960’s, almost a decade earlier. From the University of the North the boycott spread to the Universities of the Western Cape, Zululand, Durban-Westville, the M.L. Sultan Technical College and the Natal Medical School. Some white students at the University of Cape Town demonstrated in solidarity with the black students. Tiro was never re-instated (he was assassinated by the regime in exile), but with the involvement of community organisations representing parents, the university administrations felt pressured to accept returning students without penalties.\(^\text{20}\)

At the political, cultural and symbolic levels, the 1972 boycott opened the way for the recurring use of the boycott strategy, so much so, that by the 1980’s it became a regular aspect of black community life. It was the first in a series of student protests, of clashes between the students, university administrations and the police, culminating in the memorable 1976 township revolts and the countrywide civil uprisings in the 1980’s.

The spread of BC beyond a small group of university students, and the experience of the 1972 boycotts contributed towards a rejection of Apartheid education in most urban areas. At about the same time as the resurgence in the student movement, black workers increasingly went on strike demanding wage increases, union recognition, and improved

\(^\text{19}\) In his address to the graduation ceremony Tiro openly criticised government policy; the magnitude of this courageous intervention can only be appreciated against the repressive context of the time. He called for “real education for all South Africans and not the compartmentalised ‘education’ for Coloureds, for ‘Bantus’ and for Indians.” He criticised the dominance of whites at the university, that blacks were not consulted on any important decisions, and that the Advisory Council was not elected by the parents and included members without any university experience. During university holidays white students were given jobs instead of the poorer black students attending the university. The university authorities completely disrespected blacks because at the graduation ceremony the “Black parents were relegated to the back of the hall and even locked out whilst whites were seated in front on an occasion to mark the achievements of black students” (Khoapa, 1972:174/5).

\(^\text{20}\) The 1972 boycott, according to Gerhart, had the following consequences: 1) Tiro’s expulsion received extensive press coverage which immediately assisted in the spread of black consciousness outside student ranks to the black community at large; 2) the boycotts led to the younger generation accepting black consciousness, after admiring the courage of their older brothers and sisters; 3) it assisted in increasing the level of political consciousness among high school students; and 4) because of the increased political awareness amongst the youth, it led to the growth of youth organizations, co-ordinated nationally through the activities of South African Students Movement (SASM) and National Youth Organisation (NAYO) (Gerhart, 1978: 274-80).
working conditions. The watershed event that changed the terrain of labour relations was the "spontaneous" strike wave during 1973.

The 1976 student-led revolt was strongly related to the campaigns against Bantu Education and the boycotts of university students. When the Department of Bantu Education in 1974 sent a circular to African schools instructing them that Afrikaans would from 1975 be the language of instruction in 50% of the subjects, the scene was set for a confrontation between black students and the state. Those schools where the South African Students Movement (SASM) was strongly organised such as at Orlando West, Naledi High and Morris Isaacson boycotted classes from mid-May 1976. On the 16th June, SASM planned a mass rally of Soweto students at Orlando Stadium. Police units shot into the demonstrating crowd, killing Hector Pieterson, the first of over 600 students, youth, and adults killed by the police.

Students responded by burning buildings associated with the Bantu Affairs Department, police stations, beer-halls, cars, barricading whole sections of the township and attacking known policemen. The unrest spread from Soweto to townships around the Transvaal, the Western Cape and Natal. After months of the student boycott, and three stayaways bringing downtown Johannesburg to a standstill, the state eventually regained control, but only after detaining thousands of activists and banning all black consciousness organizations on the 19 October 1977, prompting thousands of young people, mostly students, to leave the country and join the armed wings of the ANC and PAC. The exodus of youths, radicalised by black consciousness ideas and hardened by the experience of the revolt, resulted in the intensification of the armed campaign in the post-Soweto period, a period during which the Apartheid elites and the regime initiated a series of reform measures to re-organise the relations of domination.

The conditions at black universities contributed to the politicisation of black students. Their location in the rural areas, far from urban complexes, the state’s emphasis on ethnically restricting the student body, the predominantly Afrikaner staff that was politically conservative, the close association of the residences, the brutal violence of the police against peaceful protest, and the emergence of a culture of political resistance from the early 1970’s associated with the black consciousness movement, all contributed in some way to student resistance. An analysis of the “micro-physics” of resistance, apprehend in “thick description,” would describe in detail the mass meetings, pamphlets; songs; dances (the “toyi toyi” as student, youth and community cultural practice), the way leadership was produced in the various boycotts, languages used at mass meetings, resolutions, the mixture of local ideologies with different versions of Marxism and revolutionary language. This culture of resistance politics drew upon and used in interesting ways knowledge of comparative cases of successful revolution, and displayed an overwhelming interest in Marxism. Intense debates on tactics, strategies, and principles became the order of the day. Emotions reached fever pitch, sometimes breaking out in violent clashes as arguments about what types of organisational, ideological and political practices constituted collaboration and what constitutes the best conditions for negotiation. Often studies of student resistance focus primarily on overt/ public forms of resistance, not on the “everyday” and often “hidden transcripts” of resistance. This paper does not address these issues, it surely alerts us to them, and suggests that they are important for our understanding of the student politics of protest.
4. The Reform Strategy of the Apartheid State

Soon after suppressing the Soweto revolt, the government established the Wiehann and Riekert Commissions of Enquiry. Wiehann investigated labour relations and Riekert was given the broad mandate to look into "the utilisation of manpower" (Lodge, 1983: 336-9, Murray, 1987), a metaphor to find a solution to the causes frustrating urban blacks. Both proposed reforms to existing government policy. Wiehann recognised black trade unions for the first time, scrapped job reservation, and accepted racially "mixed unions". Riekert recommended relaxing the pass laws, by allowing industrial workers and the African middle class to reside permanently in urban areas. For those outside these designated groups, it wanted to intensify the policing of the pass laws, in effect keeping rural migrants out of the urban zones and reducing the dependence of South Africa’s capitalist economy on migrant labour. The government also announced what it saw as far-reaching changes at the constitutional level. A new constitution, creating three separate legislative chambers for Whites, Coloureds and Indians, was to take effect in 1983; those classified African according to the proposals were to vote in elections for local, municipal councils, without representation at the national level.

The Botha reforms of the 70s and early 80s aimed to reinforce the dominant position of white society by undermining the radicalisation of the black opposition. The reforms stimulated a gigantic wave of popular mobilisation, on a variety of fronts, challenging the state and Apartheid rule in general. Strikes, boycotts, demonstrations, and riots spread across the country and by the mid-1980’s the ANC and its internal supporters could claim that the country was “ungovernable.” The state had lost control of large sections of the society and was unable to restore any obedience to the basic rules of social intercourse reproducing the existing relations of domination. New terrains and spaces of conflict opened up; with increasing numbers of ordinary citizens questioning everyday forms of domination. Of the hundreds of organisations actively involved in the 1980’s revolt mainly under the rubric of the ANC-aligned United Democratic Front, the student organisations, the Azanian Students Organisations (AZASO) and the Congress of South African Students (COSAS) and to a lesser extent the Azanian Students Movement (AZASM) and other organisations affiliated to the National Forum, kept the momentum of the student boycotts alive; schools remained closed and students, together with the unemployed youth, led the daily battles against the police. COSAS and AZASM rejected the Department of Education and Training (DET) proposals accepting limited student representation on school governing structures; they drew up counter constitutions instead. The students supported the formation of parents committees, culminating in the founding in 1986 of the National Education Crisis Committee (NECC). Until "alternative educational structures" and "peoples power" were achieved, COSAS called for the continuation of the schools boycott. AZASM rallied around the slogan "education for liberation". Hundreds were shot. Thousands jailed. From 1984 until 1988, South Africa experienced a crisis of rule (Murray, 1987).
PART TWO
THE POST 1994 PERIOD: THE TRANSITION, HIGHER EDUCATION POLICY AND IMPACT

5. Understanding the South African Democratic Transition: Transplacement

The reform of South African higher education institutions post-1994 and the capacities to implement them is best related to the nature of the democratic transition, the relationship between the state and civil society under particular macro-economic policies, and processes internal to universities and the higher education sector itself (Badat, 1995). We now turn to these themes.

The transition of the regime from an Apartheid authoritarian one to a democratic political system did not amount to a fully-fledged social revolution, where the latter in Skocpol’s sense, means the fundamental change of both the state and class structures brought about by large-scale uprising from below. The change of regime was substantive but limited in most respects to the political realm.

The path describing the transition is of paramount importance to understanding the capacity of the new democratic state. South Africa's democratic transition can be located in the so-called Third Wave of democratisation. From the mid-1970s onwards many societies changed regime types, from authoritarian regimes to democratic ones. Transition theorists classify three types of democratic transition: 1) Transformation: when those in power take the lead and play the decisive role in ending the authoritarian regime; 2) Replacement: when those in the Opposition are stronger than the regime forces and the Opposition determines the collapse of the old regime; and 3) Transplacement: when both regime elites and Opposition elites together determine the collapse of the old regime. Each type of transition is likely to produce a certain configuration of the democratic regime and in turn has important implications for its vision and institutional capacity to change civil society (Huntington, 1991, Diamond et al., 1990, Linz, 1990, O’Donnell et al., 1986).

In the extensive literature on democratic transitions and consolidation, South Africa serves as the classic case study of pacted-transplacement. Besides the global factors applicable to all Third Wave transitions, factors specific to South Africa produced the crisis of social control that forced the National Party elites to negotiate in the 1990’s with the representatives of the liberation movement. Saul and Gelb (1981) focus on the importance of what they refer to as the “organic crisis” of racial capitalism, highlighting the structural contradictions of the country’s racial capitalist system. The causes of this crisis and its manifestations include the changing labour requirements of an ascendant manufacturing capital and the political policies designed to produce unskilled black labour, the limitations of the domestic consumer market, the dependence on outside capital and the emphasis on capital goods in production, and finally, the contradictions of Bantu Education and influx

21 Huntington (1991), a leading conservative advocate of this approach, identified a cyclical pattern of two previous waves, one of democratization (1828-1926; 1942-1962), followed by a reverse wave of democratic to authoritarian regimes (1922-1942; 1958-1975). The Third Wave begins in the Southern Cone of Europe and spreads to Latin America, Central and Eastern Europe and Africa. The factors supposedly explaining this last wave include, issues related to problems of legitimacy, global economic growth, the ideological changes in Catholic Church Ideology, the end of the Cold War, and countries “copying” neighbours who had undergone democratic regime changes.
control for unfettered capitalist growth, particularly the constant complaint of a skills shortage. Besides these “economic” imperatives, importantly, Apartheid also suffered a crisis of rule. The regime reached a point in the 1970s when it was unable to establish and maintain social control and make compliance of everyday rules commonsense for black citizens possible on the terms of the state. This was both a cause and consequence of the student struggles on the campuses in the early 1970’s.

The overthrow of colonial rule in the neighbouring states of Mozambique, Angola and Zimbabwe also had a profound symbolic effect on struggles in South Africa. Remarkably, black nationalist “Marxist-oriented” governments assumed power in these countries, changing the regional political map significantly, which allowed the ANC and PAC to operate closer to the South African border, receiving financial, ideological and military support from these governments. The South African military regularly invaded these countries bombing homes and assassinating suspected ANC activists and destroying the infrastructure. In Angola and Mozambique, the Apartheid regime participated in a conventional war by supporting proxy military forces to overturn events in those countries. Although, these governments were not toppled, the years of destabilisation had a marked effect on their socio-economic development. This protracted conflict between South Africa and its neighbours prevented it from easily extending its consumer market into the Southern African region (Price, 1990). The integration of South Africa’s post-WW2 economy in the global capitalist system made the successful campaigns demanding sanctions, disinvestments, and cultural and sports boycotts, all the more effective in mounting additional international pressure for regime change.

The state crisis of social control produced divisions within the ruling elite between reform-minded (“Verligte”) and conservative groups wanting to preserve old style Apartheid (“Verkrampte”). During the crisis the community organisations and state structures increasingly entered into negotiations to resolve local conflict situations. The Botha government opened informal talks with Nelson Mandela and a growing dialogue between regime elites, the opposition, and international observers became a regular news item, developing inevitably a new "democratic discourse." This discourse sat uneasily with the government and the ANC keeping alive "traditional" rhetoric, viewing the transition in "zero-sum" terms. 22 The release of Mandela and other long-term political prisoners set the tone for an intense period of high-level negotiations for a new democratic constitution, where each side attempted to protect what it saw as its fundamental interests.

At the February 1990 opening of parliament the De Klerk government announced the release of Mandela from prison and the unbanning of liberation organisations, and called for free political activity with the intention of starting negotiations. The discussions first focussed on removing obstacles to negotiations, then on the structure of the negotiating forums and lastly, on the content of post-Apartheid South Africa. The negotiations proceeded along stages: First, the "talks about talks" stage, where the two sides met informally to establish “equal playing fields;” second, the formal negotiations identified with the negotiating forums, the Congress of a Democratic South Africa meetings (CODESA 1 and 2) and lastly, the series of agreements outside CODESA focusing on specific issues, such as the violence between political organisations and state forces (Friedman and Atkinson, 1994).

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22 The government wanted the complete disavowal of communist, radical elements in the ANC. The ANC and the liberation movement continued to speak about a complete "seizure of power".
CODESA 2 broke down over the issue of a white veto and because the Apartheid government assumed a more intransigent, non-compromising position at the talks after comfortably winning an all-white referendum. In his parliamentary address, to the surprise of the ANC, the government called for a whites-only election to decide on any constitutional agreements arrived at CODESA, a position immediately rejected by the ANC. The government made new proposals at CODESA, wanting veto power for minority parties at the executive level and in the senate. The ANC embarked on rolling mass action, calling its followers to demonstrate against the government. At the same time the Goldstone Commission report implicated government and Inkatha in the brutal violence that was taking many lives on a daily basis. The massacre of people in the Boipotong township by Inkatha supporters, De Klerk having to flee the township because of angry residents, the shootings at Bisho where Ciskei Bantustan soldiers shot into a crowd of ANC-led demonstrators campaigning for the end of that regime, and most importantly, the fears unleashed by the assassination of Chris Hani, the leader of the South African Communist Party (SACP), forced the government and the ANC back to the negotiating table.

Through a series of meetings between Mandela and De Klerk at crucial moments to avert crises, the informal relationship between the ANC’s Cyril Ramaphosa and NP’s Roelf Meyer, and secret bosberaads bringing together the negotiating elites, the major crises around Boipotong, Bisho, and the Chris Hani assassination were overcome. A series of “mini” agreements (or pacts) were established through "sufficient consensus."

Joe Slovo proposed a "sunset clause" which guaranteed the jobs of the civil service (mainly government supporting whites) after a change of regime. Both sides agreed to an interim “power-sharing” government of five years and an elected constituent assembly to decide on the final constitution based on 34 agreed-upon principles. The strategy outmanoeuvred the "spoilers" whose first preferences were sidelined; the “moderates” in both camps dominated the proceedings. At the multiparty talks, the last stage of negotiations, the government and the ANC formerly agreed to a coalition government of all parties obtaining 5% of the vote; a party-list proportional representative electoral system; two houses of parliament; a constitutional court; and an independent judiciary. This essentially amounted to a compromise, protecting the existing property relations yet incorporating the majority of South Africans into the political system.

It is against this macro-political background (of transition by transplacement) that policy debates about higher education restructuring and reform have to be analysed (Badat, 1995; Sayed 2001). Additionally, as a result of global pressures specific to the 1990’s, the macro-economic choices made by the new government delineated the parameters within which government “outputs” (state policies) were to be framed and implemented. It is to this macro-economic context (what we could perhaps describe as defensible “intervening variables”) that we now briefly discuss in the section that follows.

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23 Agreements between the dominant parties, the ANC and NP, were considered “sufficient consensus” and bound all other participating parties in situations when there was too much disagreement. This was an “informal” arrangement between the ANC and NP.
6. The Macro-Economic Debate: Framing Public Policy Output

6.1. The Reconstruction and Development Programme: Watered Down Version of Struggle Values and Emergence of GEAR

The type of transition experienced by South Africa, a transition by transplacement, together with the evolution (choices) of its macro-economic policy determine the parameters within which we can understand the relationship of higher education to social transformation. Since the 1960's the ANC espoused a left, welfare-oriented socialist ideology. In the first democratic elections the ANC proposed the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) as the core plank of its election manifesto. This was the ANC's outline of how it aimed to overturn hundreds of years of state and civil society racism.

The RDP document itself was the product of many years of debate in the ANC (Marais, 1998, Lundahl, 1999). It sets out five broad goals: to meet basic needs, develop human resources, build the economy, democratise the state and society, and implement RDP projects. Six basic principles were to guide the attainment of the goals: integration and sustainability; a people-driven process; peace and security for all; nation building; linking reconstruction and development; and democratisation. These constitute noble yet abstract goals and like all state policy documents (including the higher education policy documentation), without detailed knowledge analysing the interpretation by various vested constituencies and implementation of policy, it is difficult to evaluate with any confidence. The path from original visions and intentions to actual and final government policy is arduous, replete with political battles, winners and losers; it is often just one stage of an ongoing battle. The RDP was no exception. From the moment the RDP was placed on the agenda (as the Base Document) a debate erupted among the various tendencies, ideologies, and factions within the ANC wanting to determine the organisation's economic policy.

The importance of the ANC position on these matters is indicated by the battles waged outside it to influence one or other position within the organisation: these came from South African business organisations, world financial organisations, Western governments, trade unions, foreign lending institutions, economists, consultants and the national and local media. Due to the importance of this issue and the strong attachments to the opposing positions within the ANC and its allied organizations, as well as to the ANC's own view of itself in the South African transition, the organisation developed an economic policy that was as wide and all-embracing as possible. The RDP was a distilling of various discussions within the ANC, its allies, and its opponents.24

Initially, the ANC's Department of Economic Policy (DEP) (borrowing much from Cosatu's Economic Trends Group) produced a blueprint for extensive state intervention, or what can be called “growth through redistribution”. The ideas were Keynesian where the state enacts policies to redistribute wealth, this spurs growth, and the rewards of this growth will meet the basic needs of poor people for houses, health, education and a better quality

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24 Disillusioned, the Left position within the ANC saw the RDP White Paper at the time as a watered down version of the original values of the history of the struggle and the organisation. The white paper represented a shift in ANC thinking, they argued, away from any "socialist" commitments. It speaks of "fiscal discipline", meaning reducing the benefits the state will provide to the poor and the working class. The emphasis is not on "redistribution" but on "growth" and redistribution; redistribution is mentioned only twice in the White Paper and given the same value as growth. There was no significant change in taxation, the Reserve Bank remains independent, the government pledges itself to the agreements of GATT, and lastly, the trade unions are not given any formal decision-making power in macro-economic policy (Adelzadeh, 1994).
of life. It advocated an active role for the state in planning industrial strategy and to respond to the legacies of Apartheid. It called for the restructuring of the financial sector to direct resources for infrastructural development, for foreign investment to be targeted to key areas of the economy, “inflationary financing” to meet the basic needs of the people (corporate tax, domestic savings). The unbundling of large corporations into small and medium-sized competitive enterprises would stimulate the economy and create jobs. Low wages, the demand of business, was rejected and trade unions would have a direct role in developing policy. (Marais, 1998: 125).

The ANC document caused shock and fear among South African business circles. It was socialist, they contended, and that it would lead to state overspending, capital flight and economic disaster. The ANC leadership cautiously distanced itself from the DEP document and withdrew it as a serious economic policy position within ANC structures. The business response was quick. It published a series of counter-proposals: the Old Mutual/Necor business group published the “Prospects for a Successful Transition”; the Sanlam Insurance group published the “Platform for Investment”, and the South African Chamber of Business, the “Economic Options for South Africa.” All of these similarly emphasised the market as the best distributor of goods and services and as the path towards overcoming Apartheid legacies. The South Africa Foundation, published a paper entitled “Growth for All” where it defended what it called a facilitating role for the state rather than one that regulates, an outward-looking economy requiring greater competitiveness, and “expert” knowledge of economics rather than popular conceptions. The Chamber of Business envisioned the role of the state to ensure social and political stability, to promote small business, reduce corporate tax, spend on infrastructure, reduce poverty and unemployment, and address the skills shortage. The World Bank sought capital investment in labour intensive sectors; the state’s role was to provide incentives for investment and social support. The International Monetary Fund advocated classical structural adjustment: slash the budget deficit, lower inflation, achieve macro-economic stability, increase exports, liberalise the currency, and depend on foreign investment and access to foreign credit. It warned against excessive government spending on education, health, training and infrastructure. The secret to attracting outside investments was to decrease real wages in the short term and increase productivity (Marais, 1998).

The debate revolved around the state’s role in the economy. In the 1990’s the tide on such issues was on the side advocating a drastically reduced role for the state; this was in keeping with global trends. The emphasis was on the market rather than the state, towards privatising state assets, pleasing investors by reducing the strength of trade unions and reconfiguring the educational system to prepare young people for skills needed in the labour market.

Around the middle of 1996, there was a sharp fall in the value of the South African rand (in relation to the US dollar). Also worrying, was the growing deficit in the balance of trade account (Ramos, 1997). Both indicators prompted the ANC government, largely without consultation within its organisation and political allies, to change macroeconomic policy and encourage direct foreign investment and the exports of South African goods. The Growth, Employment and Redistribution policy (GEAR) was announced (Lundahl, 1999). It outlined liberalising reforms to the South African economy, abandoned state and regulatory protection by opening up the South African economy to global markets, hoping that in the long term the economy would become globally competitive in selected niche sectors. It reduced or dropped tariffs protecting South African goods and allowed easier movement of goods and currency into and out of South Africa. It fixed (and reduced) government expenditure by setting the government budgetary deficit (normally over 5% of GDP) to
within 3% of GDP. To reduce inflation, the GEAR framework, seemingly encouraged (or rather did not discourage) the Reserve Bank to keep interest rates high thereby lowering higher consumer demand, price increases, and making the economy attractive to foreign investment and those who have savings. The wide-reaching, almost surprising, changes announced by the GEAR policy produced outcomes that are ambiguously inconclusive.

The economy has grown, but not substantially enough to reduce the high unemployment or make a substantial dent to the backlogs inherited from Apartheid. GEAR predicted that the economy would increase by 6% and create around 400 000 jobs per annum by the year 2000. In 1996, the economy grew by 3.1%, in 1997 by 2%, and in 1998 the economy shrank. According to the Central Statistics Services (CSS) 71 000 jobs were lost in the formal sector (Osborn, 1997, Heintz, 1997), a phenomenon labelled "jobless growth." The more open market has left the most vulnerable, the poor and working class without the technical skills that the intensely disputed “new” economy values; skills, supposedly easily transferable from one job to the next, given that the economy expects people to move regularly between jobs. GEAR desires that the South African labour market become more "flexible," labour more transferable, easily dismissed and re-hired. The result is increased labour productivity, a growing economy and citizens not better off than previously. James Heintz represents the view of many who remain unconvinced by the GEAR thesis (Heintz, 1997). He suggests that increases in labour productivity do not necessarily translate into increases in growth and employment. Actually increases in productivity have led companies to reduce staff, purchase more capital-intensive machinery, and replace workers.

Working within tighter budgetary constraints under GEAR, the government has not spent as much on social services as was anticipated from a “post-Apartheid dividend”. The result is the creation of a two-tier service system in health, education and social security, one private one public. The private service sector provides relatively high quality products and services for those who can afford them; the public sector services to those without the choice and who remain dependent on the less-resourced state sector. For many the implementation of GEAR has increased unemployment, reduced, or not substantively increased the quality or access of education and health to the poor. Consequently, the racial and class inequalities of the past remain (Osborn and Heintz). More worrying is that the policy, its emphasis on the market as the valued distributor of goods and services, has left the historically privileged classes, the majority of whites and a rising black middle class as the main beneficiaries.

The ANC governing group defends the GEAR policy. South Africa, it is argued, had few policy choices and GEAR was the only available policy to address the structural problems of the Apartheid economy; a problem inherited by the new government. The import-substitution-industrialisation policy under Apartheid skewed the economy, favouring whites, led to protected industries, making South Africa less competitive in a globalised world economy. The GEAR program follows global trends and takes on the difficult task of restructuring the economy. The reduced tariffs will promote growth, increase the competitiveness of the economy, and in time companies will invest in labour because it is cheaper than capital-intensive investments and consequently the balance of payments situation will improve. One cannot blame the GEAR policy for the unemployment problem. This was one of the structural problems of the South African economy. GEAR,

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25 This private/public distinction in terms of the provision and quality of services does not apply to higher education where the established, state subsidized universities remain more attractive to those students who have the choice than the emerging private service providers.
by promoting investment will produce more jobs and it will provide better conditions for
the implementation of the RDP (Ramos, 1997).

7. Higher Education (HE) after Apartheid

A roadmap of contemporary policies, debates, and practices in South African higher
education (HE) will be referenced against that history of racialised oppression and the
multitude of struggles to overcome it. The determined efforts to restructure HE in South
Africa are best understood in relation to the type of transition from Apartheid, the
macroeconomic framework set out by the ANC government and the nature of state-civil
society relations. Higher education institutions are located in the sphere of civil society and
due to the nature of the transition were left in relatively strong positions in relation to the
state to either help reproduce inherited social relations or to help change them, perhaps
somewhat more slowly than the state and the majority of South Africans who participated
in the struggle against Apartheid wished.

The new government was not going to ignore the pressing issue of the turbulent higher
education sector, that highly visible public space where old and new elites mingled, and
besides, expresses enormous political and symbolic power in the overall social order. The
HE debate in South Africa has been intense and emotive. Due to the high regard a
university education is given by impoverished communities who historically had very little
access to higher education, and the role black students played in the anti-Apartheid struggle,
both specialists and ordinary citizens have strong views on what is needed to change higher
education institutions. The majority of South African citizens are concerned about student
access, affordable education, the kinds of knowledge produced, curriculum design,
standards, and the type of graduates exiting universities.

Higher education policy is conceived as part of a larger government vision called the
National Qualifications Framework. This is an idea to establish a certification framework,
regulated by the state, by organising, arranging, and recognising educational qualifications
from pre-primary to tertiary level into a single system of certification. (SAIRR 1996/97:
216). This objective can be traced to the extensive report of the National Commission on
Higher Education (NCHE) setting out proposals to reform the HE sector. The NCHE
report was published in 1996. Its major recommendations informed the Green Paper on
Higher Education (1996), the Draft White Paper on Higher Education (April 1997) and
eventually the White Paper on Higher Education (July 1997) and the National Plan (2001).

Transformation

In this section we discuss the NCHE document not only because it influenced the other
documents that led to the legislation regulating higher education, but as a detailed and
extensive study of higher education it serves as a useful introduction to the key issues, ideas
and debates surrounding higher education in the democratic period.

The NCHE was established in 1995 with the broad mandate to advise the Minister of
Education on restructuring higher education to contribute towards reconstruction and
development. The Commission of 12 appointed commissioners had a large research
network organized around five task groups (supported by technical committees and
working groups) managed by an overall Framework and Coordinating Committee (See Appendix A). The Commission saw itself as producing policy that broke with a tradition of key policy texts going back to those produced under the previous regime (See Appendix B).  

A central assumption informed the Commission’s approach: “that higher education can play a pivotal role in the political, economic and cultural reconstruction and development of South Africa.” (p.1) The roles of higher education in social transformation vary. At one end of this spectrum is the narrow conception reducing HE to the role of responding to the needs and demands of the economy. At the other, is the humanist emphasis expecting universities to empower individuals to assume the identities of active agents of a democratic society. The Commission saw higher education functioning to variously: a) train a skilled labour force; b) develop a research infrastructure; c) contribute to community development; and d) contribute towards the “building of a new citizenry” (p. 24). Naturally, these goals were considered to complement each other even though they could prove to be contradictory. The universities and technikons were to be transformed so that they addressed inherited inequalities, inefficiencies, faced up to new socio-economic and cultural challenges including “the changing skill and knowledge requirements for improved productivity and innovation, and the needs associated with the building of a new citizenry” (p. 24).

The Commission decided on the following principles to “guide and direct the process of transformation” (p. 4)  

- Equitable distribution of resources and opportunities in higher education
- Redress historical inequities
- Democratic, representative and participatory governance (of the system and individual institutions)
- Balancing the development of “material and human resources”
- Quality in higher education services and products

The NCHE proposals revolve around three areas: participation, responsiveness and governance. Participation deals with the problem of increasing access to higher education and changing it from an elitist to a ‘mass’ system,” a process referred to as “massification”. Bringing more poor and black students into universities and technikons requires diverse programmes, curricula and qualifications; “multiple entry and exit points”; changes in institutional functions and structures; and more funding. A single system will address inherited inequities, inefficiencies and be able to plan and “manage” increased access.

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26 Other documents not dealing specifically with HE, but which the Commission concluded was relevant to its subject matter included the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, the White Paper on Reconstruction and Development, the White Paper on Education and Training, the Labour Relations Act, the White Paper on Science and Technology, the Report of the Labour Market Commission and the GEAR macroeconomic policy.

27 The following quote from the commission report illustrates these opposing tendencies: “Only higher education can deliver the requisite research, the training of highly skilled personpower, and the creation of relevant, useful knowledge to equip a developing society with the capacity to participate competitively in a rapidly altering national and global context.

28 These are listed on p. 20 in the discussion of the Goal-oriented funding. The CNHE sees the following as the basic principles of the higher education system: (1) equity; (2) redress; (3) development; (4) democracy; (5) efficiency; (6) effectiveness; (7) financial sustainability; and (8) shared costs.
The idea of responsiveness refers to the need of higher education institutions to engage with problems in the broader society; “that of a developing and modernising African country in a period of transition from racial discrimination and oppression towards a democratic order with constitutional provisions for justice and equal opportunity” (p. 6). This engagement should be reflected in course content, pedagogy, and programmes. Lastly, the Commission called for partnerships - co-operative governance - to define relations between the state, higher education institutions and various “stakeholders.” The state’s role is defined as a “steering and co-ordinating role.” 29 Institutional autonomy is to be exercised within the limits of accountability. … The state will use financial incentives and other steering mechanisms as opposed to commanding measures of control and top-down prescriptions” (pp.7-8). From these it derived specific proposals, expanding further its ideas in the three areas of a “single, co-ordinated higher education system, co-operative governance and goal-oriented funding”. Appendix C illustrates these specific proposals.

The report provides a detailed analysis of skewed student enrolment trends. With state funding amounting to 1.7% of GDP, South Africa was spending the same as the average budgeted for HE in OECD countries. However, the enrolment patterns in South Africa resembled an “inverted pyramid”. It contradicted the international pattern where universities have the lowest number of enrolments in higher education. In South Africa enrolments at universities exceed enrolments in the other tertiary education sectors. (See Appendix D for enrolment figures for 1995).

The number of students entering higher education and the fields of study, degrees, throughput rates, staff composition, research outputs, and funding correlates to race and gender factors. Between 1993 and 1995 white student numbers dropped from 55% to 35% and black student numbers increased from 32% to 53%. Yet these figures do not reveal that despite increases in the total percentages “there was no major shift in the balance of participation rates of either the 18-21 or the 20-24 age cohorts. For white students the avenues of access to higher education were many times greater and easier in comparison to Coloured and African students. 30 A further breakdown of access might possibly demonstrate that class is additionally an important factor and that race alone does not provide a comprehensive enough picture of student enrolment patterns.

Among the academic staff, the Commission noted no major changes in the race and gender disparities of staff by 1995. While whites made up 82% of the total academic staff in 1995, Africans accounted for a mere 11%. The under-qualification of staff generally but especially at black institutions remained a problem, compounding the institutional weaknesses and adding to the burdens faced by the historically black universities. 31 The historically white universities granted many more postgraduate degrees than the black universities. (See Appendix E).

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29 Sayed (2001) makes the point that the federal features of the political system, allowing provinces to implement national policy on a range of matters, has the effect of further reducing the capacity of the central state to change civil society. While provinces do not have control over higher education, the “idea” of federal and provincial powers in the political system, helps to bolster civil society institutions in relation to the central state at least ideologically.

30 Recent studies have shown that the “massification” of education has not taken place. After student numbers increased between 1993 and 1997, universities registered a sharp drop between 1998 and 1999. More worrying is that enrolments at the historically black universities declined by 13000 or 14% from 1995 to 1999.

31 The white universities receive more state funds than the black universities. The report identified the state allocation of funds as an important instrument if it wanted a more representative higher education sector. See Sayed and Jansen, 2001.
The NCHE was a massive endeavour. Moja and Hayward (2001) recognise its contribution as having initiated a discussion on higher education by providing a common starting point, establishing an admirable example of transparency, consultation and democratic participation during the process of developing the final report, and despite the ideologically varied composition of the commission, the final report represented a progressive approach to overcoming the inequalities of the past. Despite these positive remarks, the commission and the final report was still criticized for not identifying “a coherent philosophy of education” such as the Africanisation of higher education, for marginalizing and silencing the views of some stakeholders, for not developing any proposals on curriculum development and language policy, and for not going far enough to redress past racial imbalances.


In December 1996, a Green Paper on Higher Education, condensed to six chapters, was released. It endorsed most of the recommendations of the NCHE report, differing on the issue of governance. Instead of the two statutory bodies (the Higher Education Forum and Higher Education Council), the Green Paper proposed a single body called the Council on Higher Education to regulate among other things, for advising the Minister of Education on all policy matters and for quality assurance.

The Education White Paper 3, now summarised into 4 chapters, was released in July 1997. It built on the Green paper and the influence of the NCHE report comes through. It acknowledges several goals of higher education and suggests, (ironically just when the RDP was about to be replaced), that HE should “contribute to and support the process of societal transformation outlined in the RDP, with its compelling vision of people-driven development leading to the building of a better quality of life for all.” At the same time a competitive market oriented theme associated with the demands of globalisation permeated some goals (p. 3). It identified the following goals for HE 1) to meet individual learning needs; 2) to meet the development needs of society and to provide a skilled workforce for a “knowledge-driven and knowledge-dependent society”; 3) “To contribute to the socialisation of enlightened, responsible and constructively critical citizens.” It recognises research as also an end in itself emphasising “intellectual inquiry through research, learning and teaching.”

The Higher Education White Paper (1997) aimed to restructure higher education into a single, national coordinated system. The text locates the transformation of higher education in the broader “political, social and economic transition,” which is constrained by globalisation:

“(Transition) includes political democratisation, economic reconstruction and development, and redistributive social policies aimed at equity. This national agenda is being pursued within a distinctive set of pressures and demands characteristic of the late twentieth century, often typified as globalisation. The term refers to multiple, inter-related changes in social, cultural and economic relations, linked to the widespread impact of the information and communications revolution, the growth of trans-national scholarly and scientific networks, the accelerating integration of the world economy and intense competition among nations for markets. … These economic and technological changes will necessarily have an impact on the national agenda given the interlocking nature of global economic relations.” (p. 4-5)
It expects of higher education to provide the training, skills, innovations, and knowledge so that the South African economy can integrate and interact with the dominant global economy on a competitive footing. Higher education must be “internally restructured to face the challenge of globalisation, in particular, the breaking down of national and institutional boundaries which removes the spatial and geographic barriers to access” (p. 5). It also expects higher education to contribute towards reconstructing the society more equitably. The principles and goals further reveal the competing discourses (globalisation, empowering the people, economic needs; democracy) that coexist in the text in an uncomfortable tension. It mentions the following:

a) Increase equity of access and “fair chance of success” while at the same time “eradicating all forms of unfair discrimination and advancing redress for past inequalities.”

b) Teaching, learning and research to meet “national development needs” including employment skills training for industry.

c) “Support a democratic ethos and a culture of human rights by educational programmes and practices conducive to critical discourse and creative thinking, cultural tolerance, and a common commitment to a humane, non-racist and non-sexist social order.”

d) Support all forms of knowledge/scholarship and address problems/demands of “the local, national, southern African and African contexts, and uphold rigorous standards of academic quality.”

Based on these different and perhaps opposing challenges, the White Paper reiterates the NCHE report and the Higher Education Green Paper, emphasising the importance of increased and broadened participation, responsiveness to societal interests and needs, and cooperative partnerships of governance. On the latter it called for a rethinking of relations between higher education institutions and the state, civil society, and stakeholders.

In 2001 the Department of Education released an important document called the National Plan on Higher Education (See Appendix F), which outlines the practical steps that the state would take in changing the higher education sector in accordance with the aims set out in the White Paper. The CHE also presented guidelines on how quality in the provision of higher education will be regulated. Lastly a new formula to distribute public funds to higher education institutions has been proposed. The funding is defined as a goal-directed funding

32 The section on goals lists 12 national (system level) goals including the contribution and role of research towards technological and social development; developing “social responsibility and awareness amongst students of the role of higher education in social and economic development through community service programmes”; producing skilled graduates who are competent in critical, analytical and communication skills to deal with change, diversity and tolerance to opposing views; and developing capacity for a more representative staff. It also lists 6 institutional level goals which include democratizing governance; encouraging partnerships with wider society; developing programmes that are responsive to social, political, economic and cultural needs; establishing academic climates that support “free and open debate, critical questioning of prevailing orthodoxies and experimentation with new ideas”; demonstrating social responsibility by “making available expertise and infrastructure for community service programmes;” and building cultures based on tolerance and respect. This idea of contributing towards social transformation through community service programmes is mentioned at least twice but not followed through in terms of structures and processes, rather it is left to institutions to decide when, if and how to do this.

33 Here it refers to restructuring institutions to deal with the technologically oriented economy by “delivering” the necessary research, highly trained people and knowledge “to equip a developing society with the capacity to address national needs and to participate in a rapidly changing and competitive global market.” (p. 6)

34 In practice this was likely to involve greater access of private business to university research activity, rather than relations between higher education institutions and poor communities, unless explicitly encouraged financially by the state and additionally great effort is made to change the ideological culture within universities.
system linking public funds to institutional demonstration of movement towards the goals established in the White Paper and National Plan.

8. Higher Education and Social Transformation in South Africa: Concluding Remarks

In this study we emphasise the collapse of the Apartheid state as the central demarcation point between two different political terrains. Each constitutes fundamentally different relations between the state and civil society in South Africa, and consequently the roles of higher education institutions in the two periods are different. In the pre-1994 period higher education institutions played an important indirect role in bringing down the Apartheid state by creating the conditions for student social protest. In the post-1994 period much has been achieved by the democratic government on the legislative policy front to transform higher education institutions and to make them more socially responsive and critically engaged in deepening and broadening South Africa's democracy. However, implementing these policies has proven to be a slow, arduous and ambiguous process; impressive gains sit alongside old patterns reproducing themselves both within the higher education sector and in the relations between this sector and society.

In our discussion of the pre-1994 period, we drew attention to the combination of structural, conjunctural and subjective factors that in the mid-1980's produced conditions whereby everyday rules governing social relations – economic, political, social and cultural – became contestable, challenged from various quarters, and were infused with different, alternative values to that desired by the dominant order. This situation compelled the ruling party to negotiate a political settlement with the opposition movement. The role of black students as a social force for change, together with important strategic allies within and outside higher education, constituted an important segment of the subjective factors - the resistance of anti-Apartheid forces - to bring about the collapse of the Apartheid regime.

In the post-1994 period the terrain of the agenda for transformation in South Africa is the site of many contestations. In the main, it can be argued that it mostly reflects the values and goals repeatedly conveyed during the freedom struggle: to overcome the legacies of racism and exploitation. Yet the content of these are variously debated. Gradually though a minimal consensus shows signs of emerging to address the material “backlog”, the material and psychological poverty suffered by the majority of citizens which disadvantages them in exercising the rights enshrined in the new constitution and accessing the resources available in society. The determined policy changes advocated by the new government in the post 1994 period are a matter of only a few years. Any assessment of the “impact” of higher education on social transformation in this short period is bound to be limited and tentative.

In the following section we discuss the impact of higher education on the economic, political, social and cultural aspects of society and identify some of the key issues and themes raised in the contemporary discussion on higher education.

The macro-economic policy embraced by the democratic government and the model of post-Apartheid development has enormous implications for the role of higher education in society. With the GEAR policy pursued by the government the tendency has been to emphasise two themes: The first is that the university should become more “entrepreneurial” in its own organization, outlook, research and curriculum content. The second is that the predominant mandate of the university should be to produce the person-power and knowledge that would make South Africa globally competitive by helping it re-configure itself into a “knowledge economy.” Students are encouraged to take degrees in
the natural sciences and commerce, rather than the arts and the humanities. Critics of the GEAR policy challenge these themes. Instead they emphasise other ‘non-economic” values of post-Apartheid development, importantly the role of universities in contributing towards the promotion of critical and active citizens in public affairs.

An increased role for universities in producing the right kind of graduate holds a certain appeal for governing elites and university managers. Since World War 2, South African business interests have complained about the severe shortage of skilled labour especially at the higher ends of the labour market. There are too few trained managers, engineers, accountants and other professionals in South Africa. This increasing demand, argued the business sector, could only be addressed by attracting foreign trained persons or influencing higher education institutions in South Africa to produce graduates in those fields demanded by the labour market. This view also has the support of key sectors within the trade union movement.

Initially, the received view merely wanted to increase the numbers of students at higher education institutions and to encourage them into the Science, Education and Technology (SET) fields. This move entailed a narrowly conceived view of fulfilling both the “participation” and “responsiveness” functions set out in the post-1994 legislation. While entrance and access remain important concerns, the content of “knowledge” and its usefulness to the “new knowledge” economy has also assumed increasing stature. Two assumptions guide thinking and discussion within this viewpoint. The first relies on the view that “globalisation”, freight-train like, imposes a different kind of capitalist economy on all in its path and that the South African economy is becoming or should become a “new economy” requiring new kinds of labour skills. Consequently, and this is the second point, universities should change and reconfigure themselves to produce the type of graduates the economy requires and help make the South African economy more competitive in this new globalisation era.

The NCHE expected student enrolment to increase from 17% of the population to 30% by 2005 based on the prediction that school-leavers would increase by 10% per year and university enrolments would increase by 4% per year thereafter. In 1998 enrolments reached 608 000 students, decreased in 1999 and then settled around 600 000 students in 2000. Student enrolments at all universities actually declined from 1997 onwards and surprisingly, the former Afrikaans language universities and distance education providers attracted the most number of black students. A mixed bag of factors have been proposed to account for the decline in student enrolment: the increase in unemployment, the stringent admissions policies of universities, the limited number of courses offered at universities, the poor recruitment and outreach practices of the universities, the low high school matriculation pass rates, the growth of private education institutions, the declining growth of the population, and the death toll caused by HIV/AIDS among the youth. The rate of graduates successfully completing their studies remains low. Those who do

35 Just to draw on one example from the UCT admissions policy. Here the matric symbols are rated on a point scale of 1 to 8 with an A symbol equivalent to an 8. However, the English score is doubled, disadvantaging second language English speakers, all of which will invariably be black students.
36 The decreased population figure expresses itself in lower numbers than expected enrolling for primary and secondary education. Also lower than expected numbers are taking the school-leaving certificate exam, and a smaller percentage qualify with exemption allowing them to enter the universities.
37 The report relied on unverified population data especially for the Bantustans where population numbers were never systematically recorded, and the Commission chose to rely on higher estimates.
graduate tend to join the “skills drain” by searching for employment in the UK, US, Canada and Australia.

Some who adopt a rigid, unidirectional causal relationship between higher education and the labour market, as do Bunting and Cloete (2000), assume that university graduates will be employed by a “colour-blind” labour market and the inherited racially skewed occupational structure will change as a consequence. This is not necessarily the case. A culture and history of racism remains pervasive in South African society and this directly affects labour market employment practices. Additionally, to assume that South Africa will easily slip into a “knowledge economy” remains problematic. The South African economy is highly differentiated – low skilled, under-resourced sectors rooted in migratory labour practices, a developing “ISI” secondary industrialization sector, a long-standing monopoly agricultural sector, a “peasant” subsistence sector as well as all those “knowledge” sectors dependent upon micro-chip technologies we associate with advanced capitalist economies. Any role that higher education will play in producing graduates for the labour market will have to work with a much more differentiated notion of the South African economy and the racially influenced hiring practices of the labour market.

The typical contribution of higher education to the political system lies in the creation of elites. These tend to dominate the sphere of politics, to contribute towards the creation and reproduction of the dominant ideology, and to serve as a source of “knowledge” from which good public policy positions can draw. There are many links between universities and the polity in post-1994 South Africa - formal and informal, direct and indirect. Higher education institutions have in the post-1994 produced significant numbers of graduates who took up positions in the public sector. Some universities, such as the University of the Western Cape, lost many of its senior academic staff to the public sector. Without this input the success of the transition, the bases for democratic consolidation and the quality of governance would have been less secure. The role of HE institutions in policy-making and evaluation has also increased dramatically since 1994 with many academics doing consultancy work in state related policy output. Higher education institutions provide a

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38 Two contradictory trends were registered in the South African labor market. Between 1970 and 1995 high skilled, graduate students were in demand; the lower the level of qualification and skills the less the demand. The growth in the total number of jobs was 17.6%, but the massive demand approached over 2000%. School-leaving jobs rose by 350%, for those students with some high school qualification by 53%, and those with only primary school education and below showed negative growth rates; the economy had no jobs for them (Bhorat, 1999:7). After 1995 these trends change. Surprisingly the demand for degreeed workers fell, while the largest increase was for those with a school-leaving certificate and even for those with primary education. The demand for the latter rose some 421%. More astonishing is that employment for black students with degrees actually declined by 11.84%. Employment for Coloured students with degrees increased only slightly by 3.1%, but those for Asian and White students increased by 15.1% and 10.5% respectively. The conclusion that the labor market is “color-blind” does not apply yet in South Africa.

39 The National Plan of Education (2002) calls for reducing the numbers of students taking Humanities courses from 49% to 40% and that numbers in Commerce and the Natural Sciences should each increase by 30%. The case of Brazil, a “most similar case” comparative design for South Africa, is instructive here. Schwartzman (2002) argues that the “general skills” of a broad Humanities degree be preserved, because in “dependent” economies like Brazil there will always be limited jobs in the technical and science fields; it will be the service sector where job growth will take place and this sector requires jobseekers with general skills. The argument convincingly applies to South Africa. However, we can only speculate on the size of the service sector. The majority of people operate in what is called the “informal” economy where economic relations and activity overlap with cultural and social networks opening up different political discourses as poor people engage in what Migdal (1988) once referred to as “strategies of survival”. Consequently analysis relying on data applicable to South Africa’s formal economy will have limited validity and should not be “conceptually stretched” to generalize for the entire society.
social and cultural space for both academic and political elites to meet and establish relationships. In a country like South Africa with its new political system and a legacy of deep division the importance of fora for communication, bringing people from diverse backgrounds together, is vitally important for the consolidation of its democratic dispensation.

At the same time the relationship between universities and the state is not an easy one. There exists a growing gap between the expectations of the state and the role some universities see themselves playing in relation to the political system. The Centre for Higher Education Transformation (CHET), which identifies its main role as “evaluating transformation processes” in higher education, used 12 indicators to evaluate changes between 1995 and 2000 at the University of Port Elizabeth and Peninsula Technikon. (See Appendix G). A quick glance at the indicators suggests the difficulties facing evaluation on those items that are not easily “measurable” in quantitative terms. Nevertheless, given the many conceptual limitations associated with such efforts, the CHET evaluation concludes that access of black students has increased significantly, but enrolment in the designated SET fields, enrolment at postgraduate level, and graduation success has not changed significantly. In terms of staff, responsiveness and governance more needs to be done, although both institutions have made some progress in these areas.

More work obviously remains to be done at the micro, institutional level as the policy changes developed by government take root, placing analysts in a better position to provide evaluations of higher education policy in terms of its implementation and outcomes over time, and these can then be related to the policy content. Only with a substantial body of such institutional case study material can more conclusive statements be made about transformation at the level of institutions with any confidence.

Yet few observers will be unimpressed with the extent, quality and abundance of material developed in the higher education policy making front in the short decade after the collapse of Apartheid. This can only constitute a remarkable point of departure. The stage is certainly set for implementation, and the state with the same enthusiasm with which it produced the formative policy documents appears to be approaching the challenge of getting higher education institutions to work within the proposed policy frameworks at the same time as being mindful of issues related to institutional autonomy. Yet as will be expected, the relations between the state and universities on this fundamental matter of changing well established social relations will be tested as each side promotes or protects its own interests.

We can conclude that in focusing on the relationship between higher education and social transformation, that South African Universities, like universities everywhere, tend to assume multiple roles, serving varied constituencies, constituting and responding to the social conflict within their walls in different ways and responding differently to the established social patterns found in society. We have suggested that in looking at the roles of universities in the fall of Apartheid and in the social transformation of post Apartheid society, that it is inaccurate to view higher education institutions as homogenous entities. Brennan et al (2002) recognise this when they urge that it is important to “acknowledge that universities play multiple roles, both reproductive and transformative. Within individual institutions, even within individual academic departments, roles played may be multiple and contradictory.”

Both reproductive and transformative tendencies can be identified in varying degrees at higher education institutions in South Africa. Besides “imparting knowledge,” reproducing
old elites and creating new ones, all universities in South Africa shared a common “reproductive function” in that they were formed and designed to address and serve the needs of particular racial-ethnic sections of the population; in this sense they endorsed and reproduced the prevailing social relations under Apartheid. They obviously did so differently but they did contribute in significant ways to the reproduction of the whole racial social order. Certainly, pockets of resistance were always present within universities – among progressive departments, but mostly among individual academics. At the historically disadvantaged institutions the conditions prevailing in the 1960’s promoted the growth of student politisation. By the 1970’s, and earlier in the case of Fort Hare, black universities were without intending to do so, creating the space for young students to voice and act on their political frustrations. These institutions were gradually transformed into terrains of political struggle by student organisations and campaigns. The resistance was not uniform. Periods of relative calm and stability were followed by a breakdown of normal classes when student protest was embarked upon.

In accessing their various roles in social transformation in South Africa, the space the historically black universities created for political resistance contributed to the collapse of Apartheid by becoming key centres of the civic uprisings during the 1980’s. At the same time the mainstream of the historically white universities played intensely conservative, even reactionary roles. Black higher education institutions, by the nature of the repressive design envisioned by Apartheid planners, created conditions conducive to politicise black students. In turn, these institutions themselves became differently constituted contradicting the original designs of the state. While functionally the role of universities under Apartheid South Africa were intended by the state and the university elites to be reproductive/socialising of existing relations of power, some of them became important sites of resistance. The differences in history, culture, institutional configuration, staff composition, physical structure, and university and student leadership, all combined in different and various ways, to produce different forms of resistance.

The historically white institutions played the key role in creating the large white middle class, a role assigned higher education institutions during the colonial and Apartheid periods; this class supported Apartheid, until in the mid-1980’s emerging divisions within the Afrikaner political elites largely expressed the growing frustration among this group. The black institutions also directly increased the size of the black middle class with the formation of the ethnic colleges. This emerging black middle class of the 1960’s due to conditions of study, apartheid legislation, and the racist ideology of the society found their expectations frustrated and played a crucial role in regenerating an internal resistance movement that reached significant proportions in the 1980’s.

The growing trend of the black middle class has continued in the post-1994 period with many more opportunities for upward social mobility. Graduates from both black and white universities have taken jobs in the state, private sector and civil society. They have moved into former white neighbourhoods, their children in the main attending former white schools, and participating in civil society structures formerly reserved for whites. In this middle class sense, some public spaces in South Africa have become deracialised and universities in the creation of the emerging black elite, can be held indirectly responsible for this social impact.

By helping to produce the new elite, higher education institutions indirectly contribute to the economy and a lifestyle that can have transformative implications. The growth of the South African economy from the decade long period of recession and political turmoil of the 1980s can be attributed in large measure to having the people to take up high level
skilled employment. No doubt, the problem of the “skills shortage” continues, but from the political perspective, the transition may not have reached a point of institutional stability, had the economy not grown at all. Indirectly, the increase in the purchasing power of the new black middle class has directly helped the economy grow. The quality of life of the new middle class empowers this class. Given the degree of a civic socially responsible ideology encouraged by the state and embraced by this class, it is positioned to put resources, skills, time and ideas back into the impoverished communities from which many have come.

More explicitly at the political level transition theorists have long established that without a significant middle class societies undergoing democratic transition are less likely to consolidate their democratic institutions (Linz and Stepan, 1996, Lijphart, 1990, Diamond et al., 1990). South Africa’s black middle class may not be big enough, but it has been able to give the new institutions a great deal of legitimacy. Linz (Linz and Stepan, 1978, Linz, 1990) argues that a test for democratic consolidation is when given a serious crisis key elites will choose to abandon the democratic institutions of their society. This seems quite unlikely in the South African case, demonstrating the importance, legitimacy, and value that both the middle and working classes bestow upon the hard won democratic institutions of the society.

It can be argued that the culture of democracy, of values of tolerance and the respect for citizens’ rights have slowly taken root in South Africa. Universities, which were once directly active participants in the racist, Apartheid project, have contributed to a new democratic culture. Many of these new democratic practices can be traced to the student resistance of the 1980’s, more firmly located within the historically black universities, but also influencing practices in the historically white universities, as students and academics moved from the former to the latter institutions. The many forums, seminars and lectures by prominent speakers, most identifying closely with a democratic ethos, helps spread such values and consolidates them beyond university settings. This is not to deny that undemocratic values still pervade the society, but the democratic trend appears to be dominant. The media, still controlled by well-established white elites and which have adopted a critical stance towards the new government, have nevertheless also experienced internal changes. Many of the new journalists received their education at South African higher education institutions and are products of the 1980’s student revolts. In their new role in a powerful site of ideological production, they contribute towards spreading information, democratic values, and critical analyses enhancing South African democracy.

However, racist practices in South Africa still continue in a multitude of forms, affecting all classes of blacks. Those among the poor and the working class daily bear the brunt of such abuse. Many from these groups find it difficult to get into higher education institutions because they are unable to afford the fees. The states funding proposals and student aid scheme will in time assist these students, but in sociological terms, as a class, access to universities and movement into the middle classes will remain remote. The students from poor and working class backgrounds in the 1990’s did enter universities in significant numbers. However, soon the historically black universities complained that they had to increase fees and monitor fee payment more systematically than previously because they did not receive any additional funding from the state. Students responded by participating in regular protest action in defence of their interests. At universities like the University of the Western Cape, regular boycotts took place in the 1990’s with students protesting against the university excluding students at the beginning of each year for non-fee payment. The fees struggle also brought to the attention of students other issues, such as the continued poor quality of student resources at the historically black universities in comparison to the historically white universities, failure to change the curriculum sufficiently to move beyond Eurocentric paradigms, the demand for alternative forums of democratic governance at
these institutions and a host of other alternative ideas constituting post-Apartheid institutions.

Unfortunately, by the late 1990’s the student movement showed signs of growing weakness as fewer students actively participated in student organisations and student collective action. Issues that have animated students in other parts of the world – privatisation, anti-globalisation, environmental issues, identity politics, public space and HIV/AIDS treatment struggles – have not as yet developed into a serious agenda for the South African student movement, although there are signs that these may take centre ground in the years ahead. The issue revolves around a broader absence of a vibrant civil society movement in South Africa, post 1994. Many student activists once firmly located within the anti-Apartheid struggle, many fighting within the fold of the ANC, now face the ANC as government. They and other progressive social forces are in the process of deciphering new ways of expressing their differences towards government policies and practices. The transition in social activism has been cautious given that the ANC is still fighting entrenched racist practices, and is often itself a player in contemporary resistance discourses in South Africa.
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**APPENDIX A: Focus of NCHE Research Teams**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Framework and co-ordination committee</th>
<th>Task Groups</th>
<th>Technical Committees</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 - Current Situation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 - Future Needs and Priorities</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 – Governance</td>
<td>a) National system</td>
<td>b) Institutional governance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 – Finance</td>
<td>a) Student financial aid</td>
<td>b) System (institutions)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 – Programme, Institutional and Qualification Framework</td>
<td>a) Student and staff access, support and development</td>
<td>b) National Qualifications framework</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## APPENDIX B: Key Higher Education Policy Documents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Text</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1953</td>
<td>Bantu Education Act</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>Extension of University Education Act (establishes racially based universities)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>Van Wyk de Vries Commission*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978*</td>
<td>Goode Committee*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>Technikons Act 9 allowing techikons to grant degrees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>SAQA Act (established SAQA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb 1996</td>
<td>A National Qualifications Framework discussion document published entitled “Lifelong Learning through a National Qualifications Framework.” Offers an outcomes-based model of education and training based on “programmes” designed to achieve certain outcomes. It recommends an eight-level framework with different “bands” corresponding to primary, secondary and tertiary education.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 1996</td>
<td>SAQA appoints (26 members) to oversee the development of the NQF and publishes the “NQF working document”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>Green Paper on Higher Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 1997</td>
<td>Draft White Paper on Higher Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 1997</td>
<td>Education White Paper 3: A Programme for the Transformation of Higher Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>Higher Education Act</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 2001**</td>
<td>Education ministry releases the “National plan for Higher Education” doc</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001**</td>
<td>Education ministry releases the “Funding of Public Higher Education: a New Framework” doc</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 2001**</td>
<td>HEQC of the CHE is formally launched</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: (NCHE, 1996)

* Both these distinguished between the university, technikon and college on the basis of “function” (p. 30)
** These three are seen to be the major steering mechanisms for directing higher education change
## APPENDIX C: The NCHE’s framework for transforming higher education (in a nutshell)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Major Proposal</th>
<th>Specific Sub-proposals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Proposals for a single, co-ordinated higher education system</td>
<td>1. Provide for increased access. Suggests following a “multipronged strategy” (p11) to increase participation rates to 30% by 2005, involving (a) 3-yr rolling plans to coordinate enrolments by levels and learning areas; (b) plans to match HE outputs with national and regional needs; (c) encourage private higher education; (d) expand the further education sector; (e) increase distance education and resource-based learning; and (f) restructure the college sector and improve regional co-ordination to share resources.*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Proposes that HE be “planned, governed and funded as a single, co-ordinated system” with universities, technikons, colleges and private higher education. Prefers fewer, larger multidisciplinary institutions. The proposed Higher Education Council (HEC) should manage this process through mergers, creating diverse types of institutions. All higher education programmes be offered as part of a “single qualifications framework.” This requires an effective regulatory environment, a new qualifications framework, a Quality Assurance system, new research funding, planning, infrastructure, a national plan by the HEC, institutional policy and progress with regard to race and gender equity, and submitting annual reports.**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. Incorporate colleges of education, nursing and agriculture into universities and technikons and develop a further education sector.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4. Increase distance education (report prefers a single distance education institution)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5. Introduce “rolling” three-year national higher education plans. Draft plans to be discussed with the HEC. Criteria for approving plans include institutional capacity, regional/national needs, race and gender equity goals, resource sharing and collaboration and to funding of student places. Institutional redress funding for “resources, capacity and infrastructure.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6. Include higher education programmes in the National Qualifications Framework (NQF). Supports a programme-based approach to higher education; develop a new quality assurance system under SAQA; proposes the HEQC to deal with quality in higher education and to fall under the HEC. Views the HEQC, together with SERTEC (The Certification Council for Technikon Education) as carrying the HEC’s “statutory authority for accreditation of higher education programmes.” (p. 12) New formula funds must provide for Academic Development while earmarked funding to used to develop programmes.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
7. Emphasise research and contribution to National System of Innovation

8. Identify key areas of capacity development (e.g. in research and postgraduate studies; focus on “basic science and disciplinary research”; use more incentive funding; expand access to post graduate study; support flexible entry/exit points. Supports incentive funding for research outputs, research set-up costs especially at post graduate level, allocate resources to fund research projects, expand the institutional base for research; improve student selection methods; fund bridging programmes; support capacity building initiatives.

9. Establish a National Higher Education Information and Admissions Service to streamline applications selection procedures by institution; provide information on programmes, financial aid, etc.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>2. Proposals for Co-operative governance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National Level:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Create a branch of higher education in the Department of Education to advise minister on policy matters. Also proposes two statutory bodies be formed as intermediaries between HE and the state – a Higher Education Forum (HEF) and a Higher Education Council (HEC).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Regional Level:                        |
| HEC should encourage regional structures to be “consulted on the planning needs of the region, mergers, rationalization, programme distribution, sharing of resources and the development of institutional capacity.” |

| Institutional level:                   |
| Need policies and mechanisms to address RCG issues: access (changing the student and staff profiles), development (capacity and training), curriculum transformation, and institutional culture (enabling and safe environment). Suggest restructuring of councils, senates and academic boards, and establishing Institutional Forums to focus broadly on institutional transformation (for this need student bodies to be organized, SRC helped to develop leadership capacity). Also suggest establishing Workplace Forums as specified in the Labour Relations Act. Students need to participate in decisions about student support services (p19) – therefore propose the Student Services Councils be set up in institutions to advise on policy. |

The NCHE recommends new legislation (a Higher Education Act) to specify national and institutional relationships, identify key governance structures, describe functions and powers of the HEC and HEF, etc.
Propose a “goal-oriented” funding framework for public higher education. This would have two elements:

1. **Formula funding component** – will generate block grants for institutions based on FTEs, and levels and fields of study.

2. **Earmarked funding component** – will be allocated in line with specific policy, and for targeted programmes and activities, address “unacceptable inequalities and to serve as a means of redress in higher education.” (p.21) The NCHE suggests the following areas for earmarked funding: research, student financial aid, academic development, staff development, information technology, library capacity building, curriculum development, equipment, institutional development, new buildings and new land. It states that earmarked funds should be allocated according for three types of redress: (a) institutional redress (to disadvantaged institutions; need to apply; allocated on the basis of “comprehensive institutional audits and institutional missions, programme mixes and needs assessments); (b) individual redress (in the form of student financial aid schemes such as NSFAS; and (c) other specific purposes. The NCHE makes a further sub-division into categorical funds, initiative funds, and incentive funds.

Source: (NCHE, 1996: 8-23)

* The report (p. 11) states this kind of “multipronged strategy” should:
  - Increase the higher education participation rate to about 30% (“as a percentage of the 20 to 24-year old cohort”) by 2005
  - This rate will increase to 1 500 000 students in 2005 (from about 800 000 students in 1995)

* Supports government steering “in line with broad national goals … /… by means of incentives and evaluation of institutions and programmes rather than by detailed regulation and legislation.”
## APPENDIX D: Total Headcount Enrolments in Education (1995)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>Total Headcounts</th>
<th>% of sector</th>
<th>% of Headcount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A. Schools subtotal (private public, special)</td>
<td>12 278 100</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>91.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. Further Education subtotal (technical colleges; private colleges for secondary education)</td>
<td>274 735</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>2.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. Higher Education</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agricultural colleges</td>
<td>1 930</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technical colleges (N4-N6)</td>
<td>52 320</td>
<td>6.2%</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private colleges</td>
<td>147 645</td>
<td>17.0%</td>
<td>1.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colleges of education</td>
<td>97 947</td>
<td>11.3%</td>
<td>0.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colleges of nursing</td>
<td>9 738</td>
<td>1.1%</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technikons</td>
<td>179 801</td>
<td>20.7%</td>
<td>1.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Universities</td>
<td>380 184</td>
<td>43.7%</td>
<td>2.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higher Education subtotal</td>
<td>869 610</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>6.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Education</td>
<td>13 422 445</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Adapted from NCHE (1996: 31)
APPENDIX E: Outputs of Postgraduates by Universities (1986 and 1993)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>HBU contact</th>
<th></th>
<th>HWU contact</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1986</td>
<td>1993</td>
<td>1986</td>
<td>1993</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honours</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>636</td>
<td>3495</td>
<td>4755</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Masters</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>161</td>
<td>2215</td>
<td>2970</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doctorates</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>447</td>
<td>543</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Adapted from NCHE (1986: 35).
APPENDIX F: Major Points of the National Plan (March 2001)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Goal</th>
<th>Strategic Objectives &amp; Outcomes*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Provide a full spectrum of advanced educational opportunities for an expanding range of the population without any form of discrimination | Produce graduates with skills and competencies to meet the HRD needs of SA  
Outcome 1: increases participation rates  
Outcome 2: increased graduate outputs  
Outcome 3: broadened social base of students  
Outcome 4: increased recruitment of students from SADC countries  
Outcome 5: Changed enrolments by field of study  
Outcome 6: Enhanced cognitive skills of students |
| Promote equity of access and fair chances for success and advance redress for past inequalities | Reflect demographic realities of SA in student and staff composition and ensure that race and gender profiles of graduates reflect the profiles of student enrolments  
Outcome 7: Increased equity in access and success rates  
Outcome 8: Improved staff equity |
| Diversify the system in terms of missions and programme mix to meet national and regional needs | Ensure diversity through mission and programme differentiation  
Outcome 9: Diversity through mission and programme differentiation  
Outcome 10: Regulation of distance ed programmes  
Outcome 11: Establish a single distance ed institution  
Outcome 13: Regulation of private higher education |
| Secure and advance high-level research capacity to ensure intellectual enquiry and application of research for technological improvement and social development | Sustain research strengths and promote research required to meet national development needs and build competitive capabilities  
Outcome 13: Research concentration and funding linked to outputs  
Outcome 14: Increased graduate enrolments and outputs at masters and doctoral levels |
| Build new institutional and organizational forms and new institutional identities and cultures as part of a co-ordinated national higher ed system | Foster collaboration at regional level and restructure the institutional landscape.  
Outcome 15: Programme and infrastructural collaboration  
Outcome 16: New institutional and organizational forms |

Source: The Table appears in the CHE Annual Report (2000/2001: 6). The outcomes are added here to complement that table.
* Note that, the report suggests strategies to achieve these outcomes.

The Plan outlines an implementation timeframe between March 2001 to Sept 2002 and describes the following set of activities relating to these goals:

- Institutional planning (submission of niche areas, programme mixes, 3-year rolling plans);
- Institutional restructuring (mergers, takeovers, new institutions, distance ed, private ed);
- Research (quality assurance of postgraduate programmes and distance education programmes, review of research outputs, coordination of research activities); and
- General (fee levy for SADC students, role and effectiveness of NSFAS, a National Teacher Education Plan, a model for a National Education Information and Applications System, and procedures for study and work permits).
APPENDIX G: CHET’s Twelve Indicators to evaluate transformation at UPE and PENTECH

Students
1. The access of historically disadvantaged and under-represented groups must be increased, particularly to professional fields of study in science, engineering and technology (SET) and in business, commerce and management.
2. The success rates and graduation rates of historically disadvantaged and under-represented groups at institutions of higher education must improve. No significant differences should exist between the success and graduation rates of advantaged and disadvantaged students.
3. The numbers of historically disadvantaged students at postgraduate level must increase.
4. The institutional climate must be improved to ensure the retention and ultimately the graduation of historically disadvantaged students, particularly in the SET and business/commerce fields.

Staff
5. The access and retention rates of historically disadvantaged and under-represented groups (including women) to the staff of the institution must be improved. Staff development programmes must be implemented.

Responsiveness to societal needs
6. Qualifications, programmes and courses must be restructured in response to broader changes in teaching and learning paradigms.
7. The graduates/diplomats produced by the institution must satisfy society needs.
8. Research outputs must increase.
9. Partnerships and other collaborative ventures must be formed with industry, communities and other tertiary institutions.

Governance
10. The composition of all governance structures must be representative with regard to race and gender, and must reflect the communities and constituencies which the institution serves.
11. Existing governance structures must be restructured and new ones established in line with the principles of co-operative governance.
12. The new governance structures must include an executive leadership which must ensure that the institution operates efficiently and effectively.